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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study was to outline and appraise the problems facing the 
country from where most modern pirates originate: Somalia. Another aim was to examine 
the international response to the piracy epidemic. Through this investigation, the 
argument was made that only by the resolution of Somalia’s long-standing social, 
economic, and political problems will any substantial headway be made to erase its 
piracy epidemic from existence and secure the safe passage of its vital commercial 
waterways. 
The thesis employed a qualitative analysis and a case study approach. While some 
statistics and economic figures were included in writing about the social and economic 
context in Somalia, the nature of this study required that most of the methodology be 
qualitative. The dependent variable, the topic under consideration, was modern piracy, 
Somali piracy in particular. The independent variables, the variables that explained the 
dependent variable, were the social, economic, and political problems in the pirates' host 
country, including those in the case study of Somalia. 
The principal conclusion was that the elimination of piracy from the Gulf of Aden 
and its environs depends not only on the general international economic situation, but 
also on the willingness of the actors involved to seriously address, and ultimately 
expunge, the epidemic through substantial aid to Somalia. The international media, for its 
part, also shares responsibility in keeping this modern scourge under scrutiny. As of this 
writing, the epidemic is ongoing, however, so whether or not these conditions will be met 
ultimately depends upon the march of time. 
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Chapter 1. Rationale 
Since time immemorial, mankind has been in motion. Whether it’s been over 
mountains, through grasslands, or across the seas, people have traveled in search of food, 
to trade goods, and to explore new lands. Along with these pursuits, however, has come 
the bandit, the robber, the pirate. Exploiting the desolation of mountain passes, or the 
openness of the prairies, or the anarchy of the rolling oceans, human beings have been 
stealing from other human beings for millennia. 
Through the ages, the open sea has provided some of the most favorable 
conditions for marginal behavior of all sorts. Among them has been the practice of 
robbery, which on the water is known as piracy. Accordingly, he or she who engages in 
such an act is labeled a pirate. From the ancient trade of the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman 
Empires, to the traffic of the Spanish and British Empires, to modern industrial 
commerce as we know it, this creature has posed a threat to all organized human 
maritime commerce for thousands of years. 
Foreign Affairs magazine has estimated that seaborne piracy, still a lucrative 
operation to this day, leads to an average of $13-$16 billion in losses for transport 
companies per year. The majority of pirate attacks nowadays occurs in the Indian Ocean, 
whose passages are used by over 50,000 commercial vessels each year, some larger 
watercraft in particular carrying enough wealth to keep small nations afloat.1 In more 
ways than one, the Indian Ocean has become the modern pirate's playground.  
Within this mighty ocean, off the protruding coastline of the Horn of Africa in 
present-day Somalia, in a body of water known as the Gulf of Aden and its environs, the 
scourge of modern piracy is especially concentrated. While geographically minuscule, 
                                            
1 Gal Luft & Anne Korin. "Terrorism Goes to Sea." Foreign Affairs. November-December 2004.  
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this region has for thousands of years functioned as both a major waterway for 
transnational enterprise and as a hotbed of political and social intrigue.2          
 Piracy in the area has begun to make an impact on the world stage. Its 
reverberations have touched upon the nexus of international business, politics, and 
society at large. Economically, many influential shipping companies are forced to deal 
with lower profit margins due to the robbery of their vessels on the high seas,3 while, 
politically, the current power vacuum in Somalia, arguably the world's most unstable 
country, threatens to plunge all of eastern Africa into turmoil.4 
The response by governments the world over to the security threat posed by 
Somali pirates has been relatively united. Countries with many divergent national 
interests, such as the United States, Russia, and China, have agreed that the piracy 
epidemic needs to be addressed and fought together, if necessary. Indeed, these state 
actors have initiated a largely cooperative policy of naval patrolling to ostensibly tackle 
the problem. 
This crusade has not been confined to the efforts of foreign governments and 
entities. Within Somalia itself, the unstable Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has 
made some effort to combat piracy, even though several of its members have been 
discovered to have links with the very criminals they are presumably fighting.5 In June 
2008, the TFG sent a letter to the United Nations (UN) Security Council asking for 
assistance from the international community in its anti-piracy efforts. The Security 
                                            
2 William Gordon Holmes. The Age of Justinian and Theodora: A History of the Sixth Century AD, Vol. 1.  
   John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 1919, 184. 
3 Muhammad Humaidan. “Somali Piracy Hurting Saudi Shipping Badly.” Arab News. 28 June 2010.  
   Available: <<http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article74609.ece>>. 
4 Jeffrey Gettleman. “The Most Dangerous Place in the World.” Foreign Policy. 16 February 2009. 
5 Louis Charbonneau. “UN Cites Reports of Government Links to Somali Pirates.” Reuters. 18 March  
   2009. Available: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN18379298>>. 
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Council shortly afterward unanimously passed Resolution 1816, which authorized TFG-
sanctioned nations to enter Somali territorial waters and fight the pirate threat. 
On December 17, 2008, pirates seized four ships off the Somali coast: a Chinese 
fishing boat, a Turkish cargo ship, a Malaysian tugboat, and a private yacht. The UN 
Security Council, having had enough, went on to unanimously adopt the controversial 
Resolution 1851. For the first time, those nations that had been involved in the anti-piracy 
crusade up to that point were officially allowed to go so far as to occupy Somali territory, 
acutely compromising the sovereignty of the eastern African nation. 
This thesis argues that such a belligerent approach on the part of the international 
powers is woefully inadequate in addressing the modern pirate threat. Rather, a sincere 
appraisal of the problems of the country from where the pirates originate is necessary. 
Somalia in particular provides a fascinating case study of this ancient mode of theft as it 
is currently practiced. From an analysis of piracy in its present stomping grounds off the 
Horn of Africa, will arise a modest lesson for policy-makers in other countries and 
regions suffering from this security threat. In Somalia, as elsewhere, only by the 
resolution of long-standing social, economic, and political problems will any substantial 








Chapter 2. Research Design 
 I am focusing on piracy, using the Gulf of Aden and Somalia as a case study 
because this is the region where the intriguing yet problematic scourge of piracy is most 
concentrated in the world today. My hypothesis is that piracy can only be eradicated by 
resolving the underlying social, economic, and political issues affecting those countries 
that host pirates. I will first discuss the rise of modern piracy and its effect on various 
countries. I will then focus on Somalia, providing clear reasons why the national 
conditions and difficulties that Somalia has been facing for decades have influenced the 
spread of piracy. I will then offer proposals for dealing with the issue in the body of this 
work. Hopefully, such an analysis will contribute toward a thoughtful approach on the 
part of policy-makers in other countries and regions suffering from the devastation 
caused by modern piracy. 
This thesis will employ a qualitative analysis and a case study approach. While 
some statistics and economic figures will be included in writing about the social and 
economic context in Somalia, the nature of this study requires that most of the 
methodology be qualitative. However, one can still identify the dependent variable, the 
topic under consideration, as modern piracy, Somali piracy in particular. The independent 
variables, the variables that explain the dependent variable, are the social, economic, and 
political problems in the pirates' host country, including those in the case study of 
Somalia. 
 I intend to clearly define piracy in the body of this thesis, and provide a short 
history of the topic in general. I will then discuss the effect of modern piracy around the 
globe before providing a background to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and take a look at the 
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Somali pirates themselves. Who are they? Where do they come from? How do they plan 
and carry out their heists? Where do they get their weapons? What sort of impact have 
they had on local economies? These questions and more will be explored. 
I will then pursue a study of Somalia’s social, economic, and political background 
in order to elucidate the conditions that facilitate piracy in general. These underlying 
conditions include poverty, political instability, and regional security issues, among 
others. Once the present context to the problem has been laid out, I will then illustrate 
how Somalia's history has led to the modern epidemic of piracy off its shores. 
 I will then detail the local, regional, national, and international response to Somali 
piracy, and show how these approaches have proved inadequate. I will then consider 
alternative arguments and solutions. Finally, I will advance a comprehensive, diplomatic 
proposal to address the problem, which has as its starting point a serious consideration of 
Somalia's domestic misfortunes. 
 I will then conclude by exploring the implications of my proposal for other 
countries and for global security. 
 
A Clear Definition 
 The English word “pirate” is originally an Old French term derived from the Latin 
word “pirata,” which means a “sailor” or “sea robber,” and from the Greek word 
“πειρατής”, which means “brigand” or “one who attacks.” The Greek term itself is 
derived from the word “πειράοµαι”, which means “to attack” or “to make a hostile 
attempt on,” and from the word “πεῖρα,” which means “an attempt” or “an attack.”1 
                                            
1 “Pirate”. Online Etymology Dictionary. Accessed 20 September 2010. Available:  
    <<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=pirate&searchmode=none>>. 
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 According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
ratified in 1982, piracy “consists of any criminal acts of violence, detention, rape, or 
depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
aircraft that is directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board a ship or aircraft.”2 Such a clear and precise definition of piracy 
serves the dual purpose of divesting the term of all foreign notions, as well as 
universalizing it across cultural and temporal contexts. This is the definition I plan to use 
in this thesis.  
 
Literature 
 Pirates today operate all over the world, often with high efficiency, excellent 
operational organization, and precise execution. However, the issue of piracy in and of 
itself is but one aspect of a larger theoretical issue in international relations (IR), namely, 
the expansion of international security in the age of transnational crime. In 
contradistinction to crime in the classical period of nation-states (largely encompassing 
the 19th and 20th centuries), organized crime in the present age is characterized not only 
by the fluidity of its activity across national borders, but also by its “trans,” or 
multinational character. To be sure, many criminal empires today would cease to exist if 
they were forced to operate solely within the borders of a nation-state.  
 Not only has globalization brought with it the melting of national borders with 
respect to stock markets and communications technologies, it has also proven a boon for 
transnational criminals, who indeed often incorporate the aforementioned financial and 
                                            
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. United Nations. Division for  
   Ocean Affairs & The Law of the Sea. New York: United Nations, 1982. Print. 
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communications technologies as essential elements of their operations. One hears 
frequently of how drug or arms traffickers, terrorists, sex tourists, or even corrupt 
politicians take advantage of the rapid advances in online networks to perpetuate their 
acts. 
 The security implications of this new era of transnational crime for the 
international system, still officially composed of juridical units of nation-states, are many 
and diverse. Patrick M. Morgan's International Security: Problems & Solutions3 deals 
with general insecurity in the modern era. He devotes a substantial part of his book to the 
security threat posed by criminals operating out of today's conflict zones, aptly 
illustrating how one unstable community in one part of the world can have a profound 
impact even on a relatively more stable society thousands of miles away.  
 According to Morgan, his book offers “a framework that embraces the traditional 
way of thinking about security studies with its focus on intergovernmental wars, and the 
rising concern about wars inside societies ... It includes a three-level conception of 
security: physical safety from harm at 1) the level of the international system, 2) the level 
of governments, and 3) the level of societies. Wars have harmful effects, especially in 
promoting insecurity, at all three levels. In fact, they sometimes have harmful effects on 
all three levels simultaneously.”4 
 This idea can be applied to my case study of Somali piracy. For instance, how has 
the conflict zone in war-ravaged Somalia engendered the rise of piracy, but one form of 
transnational crime, off its coasts? How have Somali societal norms and mores facilitated 
or dealt with piracy? How has piracy impacted regional and global environments? 
                                            
3 Patrick M. Morgan. International Security: Problems & Solutions. New York: CQ Press, 2006. 
4 Ibid., xiv. 
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 Transnational criminals routinely violate the laws and statutes of many nation-
states, including the most powerful. In today's global system, they have the opportunity to 
simply withdraw to another part of the world should they encounter legal problems in any 
one country, with no nation-state seemingly immune from such activity. They have 
disrupted the process of democratization in nation-states that had formerly been governed 
by military dictatorships, infiltrated and cartelized traditionally open markets, and 
penetrated the corridors of power in many capitals, all the while siphoning off resources 
that otherwise would be used for public welfare.  
 Organizations such as the UN, Interpol, and to an extent the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) exist in some measure to address the threat posed by transnational 
crime. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in 2000 
with this aim in mind. UN member states agreed to initiate a closer level of cooperation 
in fighting transnational crime, with the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee charged with, 
among other things, adopting “new, sweeping frameworks for mutual legal assistance, 
extradition, law-enforcement cooperation, and technical assistance and training.”5  
Some scholars, mainly those from the school of liberalism in international 
relations theory, would applaud these measures, and theorize that they are signs of an 
increasing tendency on the part of states around the world to embrace peace and security. 
On the other side of the divide, scholars from the school of realism would see things quite 
differently. They are highly skeptical of any international efforts to curtail transnational 
crime, arguing that an international order in which exclusive units of nation-states each 
pursuing their own exclusive interests, often at the expense of others, prevents the 
                                            
5 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized  
  Crime on the Work of its First to Eleventh Sessions. United Nations. General Assembly 55th Session. 
  Agenda Item 105. New York: United Nations, 2000.  
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establishment of an international law enforcement institution with universal jurisdiction 
that would be more effective in reining in organized transnational crime than such 
organizations as Interpol or the ICC. Indeed, this theme will later be explored in Chapter 
5 of this thesis, which outlines the response to the Somali piracy epidemic by the various 
state actors that comprise the international community. 
 As Morgan says in his International Security: Problems & Solutions:  
 “The international system … has no ruler or authority, nothing running it that is  
comparable to the way a government runs a country … States do not have to take orders 
from someone higher.”6  
 “Elements of international law and order have developed over time, such as the 
UN Security Council and the numerous international agreements between governments 
that can deal with peace and security by limiting governments' behavior. But in the realist 
view these elements are weak in practice; they largely depend on states keeping 
themselves in compliance.”7 
 “States will not cooperate to set up a powerful regional or world government or 
greatly strengthen international law because [their autonomy] is an integral part of their 
sense of security, one of the things they most want to protect … In addition, international 
organizations can fall under the control or influence of powerful blocs or individual states 
pursuing their own interests, so governments also fear that an international body will be 
dominated by unfriendly elements and used against them.”8 
 Behind these statements are the six principles of the school of political realism, 
outlined by the “father” of the school in the 20th century, Hans Morgenthau: 
                                            
6 Patrick M.  Morgan. International Security: Problems & Solutions. New York: CQ Press, 2006, 2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 55. 
 11
 “1) Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their 
roots in human nature. 
 2) Interest is defined in terms of power, which infuses rational order into the 
subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics 
possible. 
 3) 'Interest defined as power' is not a meaning that is fixed once and for all, but 
rather it varies depending on the political and cultural context in which foreign policy is 
made. 
 4) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their 
abstract universal formulation, but they must be filtered through the concrete 
circumstances of time and place. 
 5) The moral aspirations of a particular nation are not necessarily synonymous 
with the moral laws that govern the universe. 
 6) The political sphere is totally autonomous …”9 
 Tom Obokata, in his recently-published Transnational Organized Crime in 
International Law (Studies in International and Comparative Criminal Law),10 goes one 
step further and probes into the norms, principles, and concepts behind the language of 
transnational crime in international law. While the academic world is quite familiar with 
the conceptual development of such transgressions as “war crimes” or “crimes against 
humanity,” how have other transnational crimes, such as human trafficking, and even 
piracy, developed? How have the obligations to fight these offenses been translated and 
                                            
9 Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Fifth Ed. New York: 
   Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, 4-15. 
10 Tom Obokata. Transnational Organized Crime in International Law (Studies in International and  
     Comparative Criminal Law). Belfast: Hart Publishing, 2010.  
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enforced in the international community?  
 As will be done later in this thesis for Somali piracy, Obokata seeks to understand 
the more general phenomenon of transnational crime by examining its social and 
historical roots. For example, he looks at the rise of the Italian mafia:  
 “The mafia was said to have emerged in the early 19th century when the Bourbon 
state in Sicily tried to curb the power of the traditional landowning aristocracy and 
encouraged the emancipation of the peasantry by abolishing feudalism. This created 
tensions between the central government and local landowners on the one hand, and the 
latter and peasants on the other. This led to the birth of a mafia which became adept at 
managing and resolving these tensions and conflicts … providing protection for people, 
land, livestock, and produce. By the 1870s these 'mafias' were able to consolidate their 
organizational structures and activities.”11  
 Similarly, beneficial conditions for the rise of an organized criminal underclass 
existed in China with the Triads, Japan with the Yakuza, the Ottoman Empire with people 
known as kabadayi who “sold protection, settled disputes, and protected the poor against 
oppressive administrations,”12 and so on. Many of these groups spread out from their 
native lands into other countries and regions over the years. The more notorious of such 
organizations, such as the Japanese Yakuza and, of course, the Italian mafia, are well 
known to have business links in the millions of dollars with thousands of individuals all 
over the world. 
 Through analyzing the social and historical conditions that proved amenable to 
the formation of such groups of individuals, Obokata's holistic approach provides a 
                                            
11 Ibid., 1. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
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studied departure from the limited viewpoint that transnational criminals are an 
inherently seedy lot who need to be fought tooth-and-nail primarily with tough law 
enforcement methods. Unfortunately, this has largely been the perspective animating the 
international community's anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden. This thesis 
maintains that this piecemeal forceful approach is woefully inadequate in addressing not 
only the modern pirate threat, but also transnational crime. Rather, as Tom Obokata did 
in his Transnational Organized Crime in International Law, a studious and sincere 
appraisal of the conditions that give rise to the problem is necessary.  
For much of the historical review of piracy in general in this thesis, I am indebted 
to John S. Burnett. In his Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy & Terror on the High 
Seas,13 Burnett delves into a short but in-depth history of the practice, never traveling too 
far from the coast to illustrate piracy's historical debt to onshore lawlessness and disorder. 
More extensively, Burnett also examines piracy's background and areas of operation 
today.  
 Most of the works that deal with the topic of Somali piracy in particular are 
articles from journalistic publications. While some are more thorough than others in 
contextually explaining the problem in-depth, each one provides a glimpse into a 
phenomenon that is as multi-faceted as it is fascinating. 
 Najad Abdullahi’s “Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy,”14 illustrates the complex 
interplay of psychology and the simple enrichment motive behind many acts of Somali 
piracy. Abdullahi adeptly demonstrates in few words how the resentment that has 
developed over time in the Somali population towards the West has translated into acts of 
                                            
13 John S. Burnett. Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy & Terror on the High Seas. New York: Plume,  
    2004.  
14 Najad Abdullahi. "Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy." Al Jazeera. 11 October 2008.  
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piracy and terrorism toward prominent Western symbols, whether they are gigantic ships 
on the sea or even Westerners themselves on land. 
 Jeff Bliss’s “US Military Considers Attacks on Somali Pirates’ Land Bases,”15 
argues for a diplomatic approach on the part of US foreign policymakers in addressing 
Somali piracy. Bliss informs his readers that there are some voices in and around the 
corridors of power in Washington that are indeed calling for such a stance, insisting on 
such measures as providing financial and food aid for the Somali people, along with 
military aid to the fledgling Somali government to train security forces. However, as he 
makes painfully aware, such thoughtful steps are far from being adopted. Furthermore, he 
also exposes the futility of the present course of action, which is limited to patrolling a 
massive body of water that is equal in size to the Mediterranean and Red Seas combined.  
 Jonathan Clayton’s “Somalia’s Secret Dumps of Toxic Waste Washed Ashore by  
Tsunami,”16 focuses on the environmental damage to the Somali shoreline caused by a 
multitude of Western companies over the years, which have exploited the long-standing 
political instability in the region to dump their industrial waste in its waters. Clayton also 
writes about the devastating impact such actions have had on the health of the Somali 
people as a whole, and exposes some of the more culpable parties in the affair. As Najad 
Abdullahi wrote about in his article mentioned earlier, such behavior on the part of these 
commercial interests can only breed resentment and ill will from those who have been 
most adversely affected. As both authors further contend in their respective articles, the 
fact that the enterprises in question are Western in origin only worsens matters, 
                                            
15 Jeff Bliss. "US Military Considers Attacks on Somali Pirates' Land Bases." Bloomberg News. 13 April  
     2009.  
16 Jonathan Clayton. "Somalia's Secret Dumps of Toxic Waste Washed Ashore by Tsunami." Times. 4  
     March 2008: CE12.  
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considering the long and often disastrous history of Western intervention in the region.17 
 Johann Hari’s “You Are Being Lied to About Pirates,”18 is a well-written piece 
that begins by exposing some of the lies that have been attributed to pirates and their 
culture over the years:  
 “Pirates have never been quite who we think they are. In the 'golden age of piracy' 
- from 1650 to 1730 – the idea of the pirate as the senseless, savage Bluebeard that 
lingers today was created by the British government in a great propaganda heave … If 
you became a merchant or navy sailor then – plucked from the docks of London's East 
End, young and hungry – you ended up in a floating wooden hell. You worked all hours 
on a cramped, half-starved ship, and if you slacked off, the all-powerful captain would 
whip you … And at the end of months or years of this, you were often cheated of your 
wages.19 
 “Pirates were the first people to rebel against this world. They mutinied – and 
created a different way of working on the seas. Once they had a ship, the pirates elected 
their captains, and made all their decisions collectively, without torture. They shared their 
bounty out in what [historian Marcus] Rediker [in his book Villains of All Nations] calls 
'one of the most egalitarian plans for the disposition of resources to be found anywhere in 
the 18th century.'”20 
 Moving to the present, Hari likewise outlines some of the unfavorable 
circumstances that have compelled many in Somalia to turn to piracy. Indeed, there is 
                                            
17 Najad Abdullahi. "Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy." Al Jazeera. 11 October 2008.  




even more to the story than has already been mentioned by both Najad Abdullahi21 and 
Jonathan Clayton22 earlier. Along with the collective resentment built up among the 
Somali population towards the West for having its waters used as dumping sites for all 
sorts of industrial and radioactive waste, Hari informs his readers that many European 
ships have also been illegally looting Somali waters for its abundant supply of seafood to 
sell to the European market back home. 
 Mohamed Olad Hassan and Elizabeth Kennedy’s “Somali Pirates Transform 
Villages into Boomtowns,”23 along with Robyn Hunter’s “Somali Pirates Living the High 
Life,”24 both take a look at the effect that piracy has had on the hometowns and villages 
of many Somali pirates. According to the authors, it seems that many areas have gotten a 
new lease on life due to the monies that have been flowing into the impoverished country 
from Somalia's homegrown pirates. The authors also take a look at the Somali pirates and 
the details of their practice, which will be covered in later chapters in the body of this 
thesis. 
 There are also those published authors who have taken quite a different stance 
toward Somalia and its pirates. More often than not, their answer to the problem lies in 
imploring powerful state militaries the world over to bring the epidemic to a violent 
conclusion. 
 To begin, David Ignatius’s “In Praise of Snipers,”25 published in the Washington 
Post, is an article that defends the use of violence on the part of state militaries in dealing 
                                            
21 Najad Abdullahi. "Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy." Al Jazeera. 11 October 2008.  
22 Jonathan Clayton. "Somalia's Secret Dumps of Toxic Waste Washed Ashore by Tsunami." Times. 4  
     March 2008: CE12.  
23 Mohamed Olad Hassan & Elizabeth Kennedy. "Somali Pirates Transform Villages into Boomtowns."  
     ABC News. 19 November 2008. 
24 Robyn Hunter. "Somali Pirates Living the High Life." BBC News. 28 October 2008.  
25 David Ignatius. "In Praise of Snipers." Washington Post. 13 April 2009: B2.  
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with the piracy epidemic. Ignatius favors the use of discriminate and discreet military 
action in particular over any larger deployment such as invasions or air strikes. However, 
what he fails to demonstrate in his short editorial piece is how such isolated military 
actions will lead in any substantial way to the diminishing of pirate activity in the Gulf of 
Aden and its environs. 
 Kenneth T. Walsh’s “Obama’s Authorization of Force Against Pirates is a 
Defining Moment”26 hints at the negative repercussions that could follow from a policy 
of state violence against piracy. He mentions US Vice Admiral William Gortney's 
declaration in Bahrain shortly after the April 2009 US shooting of Somali pirates off the 
Kenyan coast, suggesting to reporters that the use of force at the hands of state actors 
could “escalate violence in this part of the world.”27 Walsh also brings up a comment by 
an unnamed Somali pirate leader who said that pirates would retaliate in kind if military 
operations against their operations were launched by nations to free hostages in the 
future. When all is said and done, however, Walsh still recommends a policy of military 
intervention, despite the negative consequences that he himself stated might follow. 
 Whether these authors support a violent military response or a more diplomatic 
humanitarian approach, they have nonetheless contributed to our understanding of Somali 
piracy. In this thesis, I hope to further contribute to the discussion by offering some 
thoughtful steps to address the worldwide piracy epidemic other than the simple 
patrolling policy that members of the international community have already pursued. 
 
 
                                            
26 Kenneth T. Walsh. "Obama's Authorization of Force Against Pirates is a Defining Moment." US News 
     & World Report. 13 April 2009. 
27 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3. Piracy Through the Ages 
 Piracy in the Ancient World 
 Piracy has existed in one form or other as long as human beings have been 
crossing water. Like all modes of theft, piracy has offered its practitioners a quick and 
relatively easy way to acquire wealth. Unlike other modes, however, it has often evaded 
the long arm of the law. Pirates have usually operated in relatively isolated locations on 
the high seas, increasing the chances of a successful getaway. Also, the waters on which 
pirates have carried out their heists have typically been under no legal jurisdiction, an 
advantage that pirates have been exploiting for thousands of years. Indeed, one finds in a 
historical review of the practice that the weaker a regime is on land, the stronger the 
forces of piracy off its shores. This holds true for all of history's great empires, and still 
largely applies to the present, as will be illustrated in later chapters. 
 The earliest-mentioned cases of piracy in history are from the 13th century BCE. 
These are the exploits of the Sea Peoples, who at the time posed a threat to trade in the 
Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The Egyptian pharaoh Merneptah (1213-1203 BCE) 
explicitly refers to them as the “peoples of the sea” in his Great Karnak Inscription,1 a 
series of writings about the pharaoh's campaign against the Sea Peoples, still kept intact 
on a wall in an ancient temple in Luxor, Egypt. Beside piracy, the Sea Peoples also had 
political aspirations, attempting to conquer ancient Egyptian territory during the late 19th 
Dynasty of the New Kingdom (1292-1190 BCE). Incidentally, these invasions occurred 
during the nadir of the Kingdom's prestige and political influence.  
 In ancient Greece, pirates likewise posed a threat to official trade and commerce.  
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 “Tyrsenian pirates” were mentioned in the Homeric hymn to the ancient Greek god 
Dionysus, thought to be written sometime in the 7th century BCE: “Presently there came 
swiftly over the sparkling sea Tyrsenian pirates on a well-decked ship – a miserable 
doom led them on.”2 On the whole, however, pirates posed a minor threat to ancient 
Greece, especially during the empire's prime (5th-4th centuries BCE). In ancient Greece, 
as in ancient Egypt, piracy only began expanding in influence with the decline of law and 
order on the mainland.  
 Piracy continued as a problem for the Roman Republic (508-27 BCE), albeit 
rarely and on less-frequently traveled passages. One of the most notorious piratical tribes, 
the Illyrians of the western Balkan peninsula, derived much of their wealth from acts of 
piracy, with the Adriatic Sea as their base of operations. Their escapades finally came to 
an end when the Romans conquered Illyria in 168 BCE. This in no way erased piracy for 
the Romans, however, as pirate havens continued to exist all along the Republic's eastern 
fringes. Many pirates during this time operated from such distant areas as the Anatolian 
coast, acting as thorns in the side of Republican commerce. 
 In one legendary historical episode in particular, renowned Roman general Julius 
Caesar was even kidnapped by a gang of Turkic pirates on a voyage across the Aegean 
Sea in 75 BCE, and then held prisoner in the tiny Dodecanese islet of Pharmacusa, an 
island with an area of just one square mile. According to the legend, when told that the 
pirates' original ransom for Caesar was “twenty talents of gold,” the Roman leader 
insisted that he was worth at least fifty. The pirates accordingly raised it to that amount. 
But all in vain, as upon his release, Caesar mobilized a fleet of Roman vessels, pursued 
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and captured the pirates, and had his men put them to death.3 
In 67 BCE, the Roman Senate voted overwhelmingly to address the threat of 
piracy to the Republic. It became apparent by that time that the future of Republican 
commerce depended upon it. In the Lex Gabinia (Gabian Law) of that year, Roman 
senators gave general Pompeius Magnus carte blanche powers to deal with the threat 
pirates were posing to official trade. Given three years to wipe piracy off the face of the 
Mediterranean, Pompeius “The Great” managed to accomplish his task in just three 
months.4 In the process, Pompeius managed to not only ensure the security of 
Mediterranean trade for the time being, but also to expand Republican influence into 
previously unheard of waters and lands. 
 With the Roman Senate granting the title of “Augustus” (“The Majestic”) to 
Octavian, the great-nephew of Julius Caesar, in 27 BCE, the Roman Republic officially 
became an Empire, heralding in a period of territorial expansion, prosperity, and political 
influence that lasted for approximately two hundred years. The magnificence of this era 
still resonates to the present day, leaving its imprint on everything from language to 
architecture. However, as is the case with all empires in history, a period of decline 
caused by a complex interplay of economic, political, and even natural environmental 
causes set in. In the case of the western Roman Empire, the process was quite lengthy, 
beginning in the third decade of the 3rd century CE and lasting until the capture of the city 
of Rome itself by Germanic tribesmen in 476 CE. 
 The increasingly anarchic conditions that resulted from Rome's protracted decline 
were exploited by all sorts of political actors, initially in the furthest reaches of the 
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Empire. The most prominent among them were Gothic pirates, who began plundering 
coastal towns on the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara in the second half of the 3rd 
century CE. As their attacks increased in frequency and intensity, they began swarming 
into the ancient provinces of Galatia (north-central Turkey) and Cappadocia (east 
Turkey).5 At the same time, they also began raiding the islands of Cyprus and Crete, 
leaving with hordes of stolen goods and thousands of captured Cypriots and Cretans.  
 In 286 CE, the Roman Senate again sent one of its military commanders to 
address the pirate threat. This time, General Carausius was given the task of eliminating 
Germanic pirates who had been active on the coasts of Armorica (northwestern France) 
and Belgic Gaul (northern Belgium). While he was largely successful in his task at the 
time, the intensity of pirate attacks nonetheless increased proportionally with the gradual 
demise of the Empire's strength and influence. By the time of the Germanic capture of 
Rome in 476 CE, pirates were already comfortably ensconced on the waters of the 
Mediterranean, and would continue to be well into the second millennium.  
 
 Medieval Piracy 
 During the Middle Ages, from approximately 780-1066 CE, the most infamous 
pirates in the Western world were the Vikings, a tribe of Scandinavian peoples whose 
more scrupulous members also engaged in exploration and commerce. Throughout this 
time, it seemed nothing was out the reach of Viking pirates. Utilizing all bodies of water 
imaginable, they plundered both coastal and inland towns and cities in western Europe, 
even as far out as western Spain, north Africa, Italy, towns along the Black Sea, and 
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Persia.6 No centralized power, no Julius Caesar or Carausius, existed to rein them in. The 
Roman Empire was long gone as a force to be reckoned with. Political anarchy was the 
order of the day in Europe, giving rise to the period of chaos and disorder that has been 
immortalized in history as the “Dark Ages.” 
Operating at the same time as the Vikings, and sometimes even in tandem with 
them, were Islamic pirates, who established havens along the coasts of southern France, 
northern Italy, and the Aegean island of Crete. They even went so far as to sack the city 
of Rome, along with the Vatican, in 846 CE.7 Once a fortress of imperial grandeur, Rome 
was frequently targeted throughout the Middle Ages for any riches that it still might have 
possessed from its majestic past.  
 Further up north on the European continent, the towns along the coasts of western 
Scandinavia were frequent targets of Curonian and Oeselian pirates, who originally 
hailed from villages along the Baltic Sea's eastern coastline. Just south of Scandinavia, 
and at roughly the same time, even the security of the powerful Hanseatic League, an 
economic alliance of municipalities that dominated trade along the coast of northern 
Europe from the 13th to 17th centuries, was being threatened by roving gangs of pirates, 
prompting calls from some influential Hanseatic merchants to beef up anti-piracy 
measures.8  
 
 The Pirates of the Barbary Coast 
 Across the Mediterranean Sea, from the Crusades in the 11th century up to the 
early 19th century, the infamous Barbary coast pirates operated out of the North African 
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ports of Tunis, in present-day Tunisia, Tripoli, in present-day Libya, Algiers, in present-
day Algeria, and Salé, in present-day Morocco. Often reaching the coastal villages and 
towns of Italy, Spain, and the numerous islands of the Mediterranean, the Barbary pirates 
even managed to enter Atlantic waters and strike as far north as Iceland in the 17th 
century.  
 From the 16th to the 19th centuries, Barbary pirates were well known for 
kidnapping Europeans and selling them as slaves to the political and economic elites of 
North Africa and the Ottoman Empire, with one historian estimating the total such sold 
between 1 to 1.25 million.9 Among the most famous of the Barbary pirates was the 
Turkish Hayreddin Pasha, along with his brother Oruç (known as “Redbeard” in the 
West). Turgut Reis (also known as “Dragut”), Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin (“Curtogoli” in the 
West), Kemal Reis, Salih Reis, and Koca Murat Reis were also known and feared on 
Mediterannean waters.  
 Interestingly, a few Westerners counted themselves part of this brotherhood of 
bandits. Dutchman Jan Janszoon, born in an upper-class family in Holland sometime 
around 1570, left his post as a privateer for the Dutch state, where he was exclusively 
charged with harassing Spanish shipping during Holland's Eighty Year War with Spain 
(1568-1648), for the less restricted and regimented pirate life on the Barbary Coast. Once 
there, he was known to attack Spanish ships under the Dutch flag; for all others, he 
reserved the red half-moon flag of the Ottoman Turks. He was eventually captured by a 
gang of Barbary pirates and converted to Islam, adopting the name “Murat Reis.” After 
he was freed, he assumed a prominent political career in Morocco, in later life retiring 
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from piracy. The date of his death remains unknown.10 
 Englishman John Ward was born sometime around 1553 in the southeast English 
county of Kent, spending his young adult life working in the fisheries that dotted Kent's 
coastline. Disenchanted and fatigued with his demanding job on land, Ward became lured 
by the sea. He became a privateer for Queen Elizabeth I, whose government was then at 
war with the Spanish. Ward was given the task of pillaging and plundering any sign of 
Spanish presence on the waters. With the ascendency to the throne of James I, however, 
the English conflict with Spain was ended, and Ward and other English privateers like 
him were put out of business. Ward refused to give up the bandit's lifestyle, technically 
becoming a pirate as he had no license from any political entity to pillage and plunder. 
He continued to lead a profitable pirate lifestyle for most of his life, converting to Islam 
and changing his name to “Yusuf Reis” sometime before his death from the plague in 
1622.11 
 
 Piracy in the East 
 Piracy has not only been confined to the waters off the European continent. 
Thousands of miles away, off the coasts of the great Asian landmass, men and women 
have been stealing from other men and women for millennia. Pirate raids are mentioned 
in numerous historical documents from the region, such as the Vedas in India, sacred 
Hindu texts that stretch back to 1500 BCE.12 
 Up until the 14th century CE, southern India was split into two often-warring 
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political entities: the Muslim Bahmani Sultanate, and the Hindu Vijayanagara Empire. As 
was characteristic of their cousins to the West, Indian pirates exploited the anarchic 
conditions resulting from frequent war between regional powers to plunder and pillage at 
will. One such notorious pirate in particular was Timoji, who used Anjadip Island, 
located off the coast of southwestern India, as his base of operations in the early years of 
the 16th century. Timoji was well known for looting merchant fleets sailing from the 
Indian state of Kerala for his own personal enrichment. However, he also rendered his 
services as a privateer to the monarch of the southern Indian principality of Honavar.13 
 European pirates in the 16th and 17th centuries, for their part, saw to it that India's 
riches were not the exclusive preserve of their south Asian pirate brethren. Mughal Indian 
vessels were frequently attacked by European pirates in the Indian Ocean, especially 
pilgrim ships en route to the Muslim holy city of Mecca. One such raid even led Mughal 
queen Mariam Zamani to seize the Portuguese outpost of Daman, after receiving word 
that a group of Portuguese pirates had captured the Mughal vessel Rahimi.14 
 Around the same time, on the southern coastline of the Persian Gulf, the intensity 
of pirate attacks on foreign shipping interests in the region was so pronounced that the 
area became known as the “Pirate Coast.” The British crown in particular saw to it that its 
interests were protected against these raids, especially from pirates operating out of the 
present-day territory of Ras al-Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates, leading one such 
prominent campaign against the bandits off the Persian Gulf's southern coastline in 
1819.15 
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 Off the coast of Africa, just east of Madagascar, pirates had been using the island 
of Île Sainte-Marie as a base of operations throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Interestingly, the idea of a “pirate utopia,” a sort of isolated society of pirates operating 
outside the scope of any formal laws and thus enjoying unrestricted freedom, has been 
bolstered by the apparent existence of one such community in northern Madagascar. 
Named Libertatia, it was supposedly founded by a Captain Mission and his pirate crew in 
the late 17th century, but was destroyed in 1694 in a surprise attack by native islanders. 
Whether or not Libertatia actually existed, however, is under dispute, as the entire story 
of this fabled society comes from only one source, a Captain Charles Johnson, which is in 
reality a pseudonym of novelist Daniel Defoe.16 Incidentally, in present-day Somalia, the 
pirate haven of Eyl, along with many others along the Somali coastline, bears many  
similarities to such a “utopia.” The existence of any sort of formal law in these villages is 
negligible at best, with all authority seemingly stemming from pirate gangs.17 
 However, one such “utopia” did in fact exist, but thousands of miles away, in the 
remote eastern European steppe. From the 16th to the 18th centuries, this community was 
known as Zaporizhian Sich, and was populated by Ukrainian peasants who had run away 
from their feudal lords. Along with these former serfs lived criminals and outlaws, former 
members of the upper classes, runaway slaves from slave vessels, etc. The inhabitants of 
Zaporizhian Sich even managed to form a sort of lawless “republic” in their villages, 
governed by unwritten laws and norms. Geographically isolated by both its remoteness 
and the rapids of the Dnieper River, invasions of Zaporizhian Sich were far and few 
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between. However, the inhabitants of Zaporizhian Sich, or as they called themselves, 
“Cossacks,” frequently invaded and plundered the rich Black Sea coastal towns of the 
Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate. Cossacks even managed to reach the outskirts of 
Istanbul at one point in the early 17th century, forcing the Ottoman Sultan to flee his 
palace and seek refuge.18 
 Returning to the Orient, the most infamous pirates in southeast Asia during 
piracy's classical period (roughly from the 16th to the 18th centuries) were the Buginese 
sailors of South Sulawesi, an island in Indonesia situated between Borneo and the 
Maluku archipelago. From Singapore in the southwest to the Philippines in the northeast, 
these pirates used the entire region as their playground. Likewise, members of the Orang 
Laut peoples of the Indonesian Riau island chain often resorted to piracy, along the 
coastlines of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore. Members of the Malay and Dayak 
peoples also joined in the fray, preying on shipping interests  
in the waters between Singapore and Hong Kong from their havens in Borneo.19 
 In eastern Asia, from the 13th century onward, Japanese pirates called wokou 
raided and plundered for more than 300 years. The theories for their decline are 
numerous, with the most accepted pointing to the increasing strength of the Portuguese 
Empire in the region beginning in the 16th century.20 Here, as in the days of classical 
Egypt, Greece, and Rome, when an empire increases in strength and influence, pirate 
activity decreases accordingly. Indeed, as the succinct title of Robert D. Kaplan's April 
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11, 2009 New York Times article points out in relation to Somali piracy even today, 
“Anarchy on Land Means Piracy at Sea.”21 
 Historically, however, the most powerful pirate fleets in eastern Asia were not 
Japanese, but Chinese, particularly during the middle years of the Chinese Qing dynasty 
(in the 18th and 19th centuries). Chinese pirates had a marked effect on the economy at the 
time, threatening vital commercial arteries around the areas of Fujian and Guangdong. As 
in Somalia today, Chinese pirates in those days controlled political life in many coastal 
Chinese villages, collecting revenue through extortion and other underhanded methods.22 
 In the early years of the 19th century, the world of Chinese piracy was given a 
boost when young gangster Zheng Yi inherited the pirate fleet of his cousin, Zheng Qi. 
Zheng Yi went on to form a fraternity of pirates that by 1804 would number more than 
ten thousand men, at one point even rivaling the strength of the Qing navy itself. 
Interestingly, it was Zheng Yi's wife, Zheng Yi Sao, who would eventually inherit the 
leadership of this confederacy, proving that the world of the pirate can belong as much to 
the female as to the male. 
 However, Chinese piracy as a force to be reckoned with in 19th-century China 
suffered a set of blows when famine swept the Chinese mainland in the 1820s. Also, the 
increasing strength of the Qing navy at the time, along with internal squabbling and 
intrigues in the pirate world, reduced Chinese piracy to marginal influence. The sort of 
power that Chinese pirates enjoyed during the 18th century was never to be reached again. 
 In one last hurrah, Chinese pirates fought against both American and British naval 
forces in 1855, at the Battle of Ty-ho Bay, in present-day Hong Kong harbor. At the end 
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of the skirmish, the USS Powhatan and the HMS Rattler destroyed a total of eighteen 
pirate junks. Chinese pirate influence was further diminished during the Second Opium 
War (1856-1860), when British naval forces led frequent campaigns against piracy, 
destroying many pirate junks in their wake.23 
 
 The Pirates of the New World 
 While the pirates of the Old World certainly deserve their place in the sun, it is 
the pirates of the New who have captured the minds of many in the West. Piracy in the 
Americas began with the large-scale colonization of the New World by Spanish and 
Portuguese settlers and explorers in the 15h century. Along with the new imperial towns 
and villages that were sprouting up all over the newly-colonized lands came men and 
women who engaged in the practice of piracy, one of the era's most lucrative 
occupations. What is today known as the “classical” period of piracy in the region began 
in approximately 1560, and extended up until the first quarter of the 18th century.  
 Many Europeans traveled to the Caribbean after the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714), and soon became swayed by the allure of living a pirate lifestyle 
in a land of palm trees and crystal clear waters, heralding in one of piracy's most 
prevalent periods in the New World. However, there were earlier arrivals to the region, 
namely, the buccaneers. Originally attempting honest occupations, such as farming or 
hunting on Hispaniola and other Caribbean islands, many were soon enticed by the more 
profitable pursuit of piracy, and began preying on the vessels of the then-dominant 
Spanish shipping trade from the middle to late 17th century. Privateering was also an 
option, with many hiring out their services to one or another rival European empire 
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operating in the region, be it the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, or French.24 
 Some of the most well-known pirates in popular culture lived and breathed during 
this period, operating out of such havens as New Providence in the Bahamas, Tortuga in 
Haiti, or Port Royal in Jamaica. Edward Teach, or “Blackbeard” as he is more commonly 
known in the West,  “Calico Jack” Rackham, and Bartholomew Roberts were just some 
of the more notorious outlaws stalking the bountiful waters. Many, however, were hunted 
down by imperial navies and executed, if the battles they fought with their pursuers didn't 
succeed in doing so first.  
 By the early years of the 19th century, the prevalence and effectiveness of piracy 
in the Caribbean declined, mirroring the emerging power of the United States in the 
region. The US Navy in particular dealt with pirates repeatedly during this period, 
patrolling the waters of the Caribbean, and even as far east as the Mediterranean Sea. One 
of the more famous pirates during this time was Roberto Cofresi, who operated out of 
Puerto Rico and was seen by many natives on the Caribbean island as a sort of modern-
day Robin Hood, robbing from the opulent vessels of the empires to distribute to the 
poor.25 In 1825, however, he was captured by the USS Grampus, turned over to the 
Spanish, and then summarily executed. The US navy in the meantime continued to roam 
the Caribbean in search of pirate gangs.  
Piracy in the northern parts of the Americas continued until the late 1870s. 
Caribbean pirates often sailed north and attacked vessels off the US's eastern coastline. 
The most notorious raider was none other than Blackbeard, who in his exploits in the 
American south during the early 18th century even managed at one point to blockade 
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Charleston, South Carolina.26 After Blackbeard came Jean Lafitte, seen by many 
historians as “the last buccaneer.”27 Operating primarily in the Gulf of Mexico in the 
early 19th century, the size, scope, and efficiency of Lafitte's pirate army had hitherto 
been unprecedented in history, with pirate havens that even extended to parts of the US 
mainland (Louisiana and Texas). Lafitte was finally expelled from US territory by 
American forces in the early 1820s, and died in 1823 after a botched raid on what at first 
appeared to the pirate leader to be two Spanish merchant vessels, but in actuality were 
heavily armed warships.28 
 In 1870, in what was to be piracy's last hurrah in the New World, a gang of 
Mexican pirates attacked and captured the town of Guaymas, endangering the US 
consulate in the city. Washington, upon hearing of the incident, launched a naval 
expedition under Rear Admiral Willard H. Brownson to the region. Brownson's squadron 
managed to eliminate the pirate threat in short order, in a skirmish that has become 
known in the annals of history as the Battle of Boca Teacapan.29 After this episode, the 
20th century came and went with almost no pirate activity in the Western Hemisphere, 
save a few inconsiderable occurrences.  
 
 Modern Piracy 
 Throughout history, pirates have largely engaged in the practice to enrich 
themselves and their crews. An act of piracy conducted for any other reason, most 
notably politics, was altogether a rare occurrence. This is largely due to semantics, as 
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those who engaged in political piracy in the past were known as “privateers” or 
“corsairs.” What these characters were called depended upon the motive for each attack 
they carried out, with one camp often maligning its opponent's privateers as “pirates” and 
vice versa in times of conflict. However, ever since the international condemnation of 
privateering as a tactic of warfare under the Paris Declaration of 1856, state actors have 
for the most part kept away from its application on the open waters in wartime.30 
Consequently, the confusion that arose over whether or not this or that sea robber was a 
“pirate” or “privateer” was largely eliminated from the public discourse.  
 Today, political piracy is mainly conducted by individuals or groups not officially 
affiliated with any nation-state. Acts of political piracy in this mold are far more 
numerous in the present age than at any time in the past, due in large part to the rapid 
advances in transportation technologies that were reached in the 20th century. Indeed, 
ever since the emergence of air travel as a reliable means of transport in the 1920s, most 
pirate attacks of a political nature have occurred in the skies. Incidentally, while 
“hijacking” is the term for such acts in English, piracy in the air is still regarded as such 
in other languages. In French, for example, the term for a plane hijacker is pirate de l'air, 
or, literally, “air pirate.”  
 The first recorded incident of “air piracy” occurred on February 1931. Pilot Byron 
Richards was flying a Ford Tri-Motor aircraft over Arequipa, Peru, when he was accosted 
from the ground by armed revolutionaries. The condition for his release was that he was 
to give one of the revolutionaries a ride to Lima.31 As time went on, and the airplane 
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began increasing its presence on the international travel market, an exponential increase 
in the rate of airborne pirate attacks of a political nature occurred. This reached its peak 
during the late 1960s with the emergence of the era's famous protest movements.  
 There were 82 such attacks in 1969, the largest ever recorded in a single year.32 
Perhaps the most infamous act of air piracy for a political purpose, however, occurred 
more than thirty years later. On 11 September 2001, Islamist terrorists seized four aircraft 
and subsequently crashed them into prominent symbols of American power in New York 
City and Washington, DC, leading to the deaths of thousands of civilians both on board 
the aircraft and in the respective buildings. This event still resonates in the minds of many 
in the West more than a decade later, and has unfortunately magnified the utility of 
airborne piracy as another tool in the arsenal of terrorism. 
 Even though airplanes have taken over as the dominant mode of international 
transportation, seaborne piracy has not lost its appeal in the modern age. As they have for 
thousands of years, commercial vessels still plow the waters of the world, and are still the 
target of pirates of all nationalities and creeds. Most acts of seaborne piracy are carried 
out with the sole purpose of enriching the interlopers, as they have been for millennia. 
However, as will be seen later in the case study of Somali piracy, politics, along with 
complex psychological factors, can also be intertwined with the traditional enrichment 
motive as an explicatory variable for why today's pirates of the sea do what they do. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, seaborne piracy today leads to $13-$16 billion in 
losses for transport companies annually, with passages in the vicinity of the Indian 
Ocean, where modern piracy is particularly concentrated, used by over 50,000 
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commercial vessels each year.33 Other areas that have seen recent acts of piracy include 
the South China Sea, located between the countries of Vietnam and the Philippines, and 
the Niger Delta, located off the southern coast of the west African country of Nigeria.  
 Without a doubt, the greatest benefit that pirates draw from their practice is its 
territorial anonymity. Pirates have been exploiting the anarchy of the high seas, waters 
that are outside the legal domain of any nation-state, for thousands of years. The 
international community has adopted the concept of universal jurisdiction, which states 
that action can be taken against pirates without objection from the flag state of the pirate 
vessel, in an attempt to address this window in international law. This, however, cannot 
contravene the fact that the high seas remain outside the territorial waters of any state, 
which presents a complex legal situation should any one state actor wish to pursue 
prosecution against pirates who had acted outside its territory.  
 With regard to the concept of universal jurisdiction, the political stability of the 
pirate vessel's flag state largely determines whether or not the state can apply it. Somalia, 
for example, in a constant state of civil war since the early 1990s, lacks the basic political 
and legal wherewithal to prosecute the pirates who hail from its towns and cities. Also, as 
briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the anarchy that reigns in the country has proven 
conducive to a widespread culture of corruption in what passes for its political elite, as 
many members of its transitional government have given into temptation and accepted 
bribes and solicitations from many wealthy pirate leaders.34 Somalia's piracy problem, 
along with the intersection of international law with piracy in general, will be covered in 
further detail in this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
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 Other conditions that facilitate piracy in the modern age are quite incidental, but 
are still worth mentioning. Firstly, in an effort to restrict piracy, many nations forbid 
ships to enter their territorial waters or ports if the crew of the ships are armed, even if the 
armed men belong to well-known private security agencies that the shipping company 
has hired to protect its vessels.35 Secondly, authorities have estimated that only between 
10-50 percent of pirate attacks are actually reported as such by shipping companies to 
their insurers, so as not to increase premiums.36 This has served to further mask the 
activities of pirates worldwide, which only proves beneficial for their continual evasion at 
the hands of authorities. 
 Compared to the financial and human impact of such ongoing conflicts as those 
between the Palestinians and Israelis or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the impact of 
modern piracy has been quite insignificant. More pressing are the conditions that have 
facilitated and given rise to the phenomenon, which in the present age are primarily of a 
political nature. In the case of Somalia, the impact of its ongoing civil war is indeed on 
the minds of many policy-makers around the world, not only because Somalia's own 
internal instability has proven conducive to the growth of piracy off its shores, but also 
because the security of the entire region is threatened by the anarchy that is presently 
reigning in the country.37 
 The activities of pirates worldwide continue to pose a problem not so much for 
political entities as they do for those engaged in commerce, namely, the shipping 
companies both large and small that depend upon the safe passage of the world's 
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waterways. However, as is the case with many elements in today's complex and rapidly 
integrating world, the intersection of economics with politics has assumed a fluid and 
seamless character. Many larger shipping companies, such as Denmark's A.P. Moller-
Maersk Group, have links with all sorts of interests all over the world, and have assumed 
an influential voice in the corridors of power in many capitals.38  
The safety and security of the world's shipping routes is in the interests of many 
actors, chief among them political elites who recognize both the financial and symbolic 
value of their country's national shipping champions. As will be covered in more detail in 
Chapter 5, many countries, some even with divergent interests, have assembled their 
naval forces in a largely cooperative campaign against piracy, with the Gulf of Aden the 
principal target of their efforts due to its concentration of pirate activity. This is the 
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4. Case Study: Somalia 
 Nature of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
 The Gulf of Aden is a narrow body of water that is located between the east 
African country of Somalia and the southwest Arabian country of Yemen, where the 
Horn of Africa juts out into the Indian Ocean. For thousands of years, vessels have sailed 
west through the Gulf and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait on their way to the great Arabian 
markets on the coastlines of the Red Sea or further north through the Suez Canal to the 
European markets of the Mediterranean. If sailing east from the Mediterranean, they 
would head toward the equally great Asian markets off the waters of the Indian Ocean.1  
Figure 1. The Gulf of Aden
2 
 The strategic significance of this ancient commercial route has not been lost in the 
present age. Indeed, were Atlantic- and Mediterranean-bound ships to sail around Africa 
instead of through the Gulf of Aden, they would rack up weeks and millions of dollars on 
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their balance sheets. The amount of wealth that travels through the gulf easily reaches 
into the billions of dollars, ensuring its status as one of the world's premier commercial 
waterways.3 It has proven vital as a water passage for Persian Gulf oil in particular, a 
product that in and of itself powers many of the world's most productive economies, with 
approximately 11 percent of the world's seaborne petroleum making its way through the 
gulf's waters.4 Along with Aden on the southern coast of Yemen, from which the gulf 
derives its name, Djibouti City in Djibouti, and Zeila, Berbera, and Bosaso in Somalia all 
function as important ports off its waters. 
 However, alongside the merchants who have plied these waters for generations 
have come pirates of all shapes, colors, and creeds, opportunistically attaching 
themselves to the gulf's commercial traffic and preying on its vessels. Today, the pirates 
operating in the region are almost exclusively of Somali origin. Indeed, while piracy has 
existed in the region for thousands of years, the rate of pirate attacks in the gulf has 
increased exponentially since the beginning of the second phase of Somalia's civil war, 
beginning roughly in 2005.5  
 While most attacks are unsuccessful, the pirates themselves usually fleeing at the 
slightest hint of capture, a substantial portion of hijackings do prove lucrative. In 2008, of 
the 111 pirate attacks in the region, 42 were successful.6 The pirates expanded their 
operations in both scope and intensity in January and February 2009, with the rate of 
pirate attacks skyrocketing tenfold over the course of one year. Just one month later, 
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pirate attacks in the region were almost a daily occurrence, with 21 successful hijackings, 
of the 79 attempted, by the middle of April 2009.7 With the pirates' newfound riches 
came bigger ships, guns, and manpower. This has enabled them to expand their 
operations beyond the Gulf of Aden, with some Somali pirates even attacking ships as far 
away as the Indian and Tanzanian coasts.8  
 As these words are being written, the pirate attacks have been continuing apace. 
There were four prominent attacks spanning March to May 2011. On March 4, the 
merchant vessel (MV) Guanabara, a Bahamian-flagged ship owned by a Japanese firm, 
was carrying 24 crew members and a large oil cargo when it was captured in the Indian 
Ocean, 607 kilometers southeast of Oman. The hostages were promptly released a day 
later, however, when a naval team from the USS Bulkeley boarded the Guanabara and 
apprehended the suspected pirates. Said pirates were later tried in Japan.9 
 Just two weeks later, on 16 March 2011, the Indonesian-flagged and -owned MV 
Sinar Kudus, a cargo vessel carrying 20 crew members and a US$225 million-worth 
shipment of ferronickel, was captured by a team of Somali pirates. The perpetrators at 
first demanded a ransom of US$2.5 million for the crew members, but this was increased 
to US$3.5 million and then to US$9 million when their successive demands were 
ignored. Finally, after 46 days of detention, the hostages were released once the pirates 
received payment from the Sinar Kudus’ owner, publicly listed Indonesian company PT 
Samudera Indonesia (PTSI). The amount given to the pirates is under dispute, with pirate 
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leaders claiming to have received US$4.5 million from the company, while PTSI itself 
has remained silent on the issue. Unlike the US response onboard the Guanabara two 
weeks before the Sinar Kudus incident, however, the Indonesian government avoided a 
violent confrontation with the pirates, in consideration of the hostages’ safety.10 
 Then, two months later, on 5 May 2011, a distress call sounded from Panamanian-
flagged, Chinese-owned MV Full City. Pirates had boarded the ship, at the time situated 
approximately 850 kilometers west of the western Indian state of Karnataka. All 24 
Chinese crew members on board, however, had already locked themselves up in the 
vessel’s “citadel,” a secured room built precisely for such an emergency. From within its 
confines, they then promptly sent out a radio message notifying nearby vehicles that they 
were under attack. Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships patrolling the general area rushed 
to the Full City’s help, having been preceded by the Indian Navy’s TU-142 maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft, which had conducted several low passes over the Full City and 
demanded that the pirates abandon their attempt to hijack the vessel. The pirates, 
threatened by the aircraft, abandoned the Full City, boarded the skiff they had used to 
board the vessel, and then “rushed to a pirate ‘mother vessel’ nearby, which fled from the 
site at full speed.”11 
 Exactly one week later, on 12 May, a Danish warship, the Esbern Snare, 
approached a suspected pirate “mother ship” while on routine patrol in the waters off the 
Somali coast. (Pirate “mother ships” are in actuality larger vessels that have been 
captured by pirates and utilized as offshore bases for their operations.) The Esbern Snare 
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attempted to stop the suspected pirate vessel by blaring a message through its 
loudspeaker. Instead of stopping, however, the other vessel opened fire, which the Esbern 
Snare promptly returned. The better-armed Danish vessel came out ahead in the skirmish, 
and indeed discovered that the other vessel was a pirate ship, with 16 hostages in tow. 
When the dust finally settled, four pirates’ lives were lost, ten were  
wounded, and the 16 hostages were freed, unscathed. The pirates who survived the 
confrontation were all captured, and are presently awaiting trial in Denmark.12 
 
 Somalia and Its Pirates 
 The success of many of the pirates’ operations, at times leading to heists worth 
millions of dollars, has stirred the popular imagination in Somalia. In a land of 
widespread poverty and political instability, many locals have questioned the criminality 
of a practice that has brought in so much newfound wealth. Some scholars have ironically 
pointed to a new model of development for impoverished countries: Rob from the rich 
and bring the loot back home to spend, thus jump-starting ailing economies.13 
 Entire villages that were once nothing more than tiny coastal fishing spots, such 
as Eyl and Harardhere, have been transformed into veritable boomtowns. In these modern 
pirate havens, the pirates do largely as they please, with law and order seemingly 
stemming from their hands. Impoverished towns and villages that were once in a 
prolonged state of decay are “now bustling with restaurants, Land Cruisers, and internet 
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cafes,”14 many of which the pirates own themselves. 
According to Abdi Farah Juha, a resident of the northern Somali town of 
Garoowe, “They have money. They have power, and they are getting stronger by the day 
... They marry the most beautiful girls. They build big houses. They have new cars, new 
guns ...”15  
 While the general situation is still bleak in regards to poverty and political 
instability in Somalia, many locals in pirate-rich areas have begun to appreciate the 
amenities that in richer countries are often taken for granted. Local shop owners and 
others have used the new monies flowing into their villages from the pirates to purchase 
items such as water filters and generators, with a full day of electricity in many parts of 
Somalia previously being seen as an unimaginable luxury. “The pirates depend on us, and 
we benefit from them,” said Sahra Sheik Dahir, a shop owner in Harardhere.16 Some 
people even ensure that the pirates' supply of qat, a popular stimulating narcotic leaf, is 
well stocked, and offers support in countless other ways. “Regardless of how the money 
is coming in, legally or illegally, I can say it has started a life in our town,” said 36-year-
old mother Shamso Moalim in Harardhere. “Our children are not worrying about food 
now, and they go to ... school in the morning and play soccer in the afternoon. They are 
happy.”17 
 According to a BBC report, there are presently at least five pirate gangs and a 
total of 1,000 armed pirates operating out of Somalia. Somali pirates, usually between the 
ages of 20 and 35 and from the northeastern region of Puntland, can largely be divided 
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into three main categories:  
1) Local fisherman, considered the brains of the pirates’ operations due to their skill and 
knowledge of the sea.  
2) Ex-militiamen who used to fight for local warloads, considered the brawn of the 
pirates’ operations.  
3) Technology experts, who operate and modernize the pirates’ equipment.18 
 Furthermore, there are four main groups believed to be operating off the Somalia 
coast:  
1) The “National Volunteer Coast Guard” (NVCG), commanded by Garaad Mohamed, is 
believed to specialize in intercepting small boats and fishing vessels around the town of 
Kismayo, on Somalia’s southern coast.  
2) The “Marka group,” commanded by Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad (also known as 
Yusuf Indha’adde), is composed of several scattered and less-organized groups operating 
around the town of Marka, also on Somalia’s southern coast.  
3) The “Puntland group” is made up of traditional Somali fishermen operating around the 
region of Puntland, in northeast Somalia.  
4) The “Somali Marines” are believed to be the most powerful and sophisticated of the 
pirate groups. They operate under a military structure, with a fleet admiral, admiral, vice-
admiral, and a head of financial operations all in the chain of command.19 
 On the sea, these pirate gangs operate in much the same manner. Many are able to 
hijack a large ship relatively easily from just small motorboats, taking advantage of the 
fact that most commercial cargo vessels today usually only carry a few crew members. 
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However, the number of pirates per expedition depends on their scheme for the targeted 
vessel. If the plan is a simple raid on the ship’s safe, then only four to ten pirates are 
needed. However, if they plan to seize the entire vessel, thereby holding the crew hostage 
for a cash ransom, then up to 70 pirates are usually mobilized. This also depends, of 
course, on the size of the ship and its crew.20 
 Somali pirates have become well-known for making use of advanced technology 
before, during, and after their heists, from the most up-to-date cell phones and global 
positioning systems (GPS) to modern speedboats. Likewise for their choice of weaponry, 
with the latest models of assault rifles, shotguns, pistols, mounted machine guns, and 
even rocket-propelled grenades and grenade launchers figuring in their inventory. From 
the photographs that are available, the Somali pirates’ weapons look to be predominantly 
of Russian and Chinese make, with AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, and TT-
30 semi-automatic pistols making frequent appearances. Also, they are reputed to carry 
the RGD-5 or F1 hand grenades, also of Russian design.21 
 The source of much of this weaponry is Yemen, but a large amount also comes 
from the Somali capital, Mogadishu. There, the open-air Bakaara Market has become 
renowned as the largest in the nation, where one can buy essentially anything one desires 
as far as weaponry is concerned, as well as forged passports and all sorts of other 
inauthentic documents. Gunfire is commonly heard in the area, as shoppers fire weapons 
into the air to test them before purchase. In 2001, a rough estimate by aid agencies placed 
the number of assault rifles in Mogadishu at somewhere near one million, in a city 
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population of 1.5 million.22 In the capital, weapons dealers receive a deposit from a 
middleman on behalf of the pirates via a “hawala” company, a term that denotes an 
informal money transfer system based on honor. The weapons are then driven to the 
northern Somali region of Puntland, where the pirates pay the balance upon delivery.  
 Apart from the raiding of ship safes, pirates also derive funding from a variety of 
other sources. When it comes to ransoms, money is usually paid in large-denomination 
US dollar bills. It is delivered to the pirates on board the hijacked ship in burlap sacks, 
which are either dropped from helicopters or encased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto 
tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, which was 
the case in January 2009, when an orange container with $3 million cash inside was 
dropped onto the deck of the Saudi supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of 
ship and crew.23 
 To authenticate the banknotes that are dropped or carried to them, pirates use 
currency-counting machines, the same type used at foreign exchange bureaus the world 
over. According to one pirate, these gadgets are purchased from business connections in 
Dubai, neighboring Djibouti, and other areas.24 Hostages, for their part, usually have to 
wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their release. 
 Another source of illicit support for the pirates is, reportedly, wealthy 
businessmen in Dubai. According to Christopher Ledger, director of the maritime 
security company Idarat Maritime, “There is evidence that syndicates based in the Gulf – 
some in Dubai – play a significant role in the piracy which is taking place off the African 
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coast. There are huge amounts of money involved and this gives the syndicates access to 
increasingly sophisticated means of moving money as well as access to modern 
technology in carrying out the hijackings. This is [indeed] an international problem …”25 
Due to the ongoing worldwide economic recession, however, it is apparently the 
businessmen these days who are receiving funding from the pirates.26 
 Last but not least, one also has to consider the Somali diaspora, a community that 
over the years has scattered all over the world. Somali expatriates send funds, equipment, 
and information to the pirates. As mentioned previously, after their heists the pirates 
spend their newfound gains onshore, in the process rejuvenating impoverished towns and 
villages, a fact of which the Somali expatriates are perfectly aware and largely 
supportive. There are reputedly some 200,000 Somalis living in Canada, for example, 
who are allegedly a large source of funding for the pirates. There is also a substantial 
community of Somali migrants living in Columbus, Ohio, reputedly another source of 
pirate funds in North America.27 
 For the next section, the question I seek to answer is: What influences Somalis to 
engage in piracy? 
 
 The Social & Economic Conditions that Influence Somali Piracy 
 Today, Somalia stands as one of the poorest countries in the world, with an 
estimated per capita GDP of only $600/year.28 Millions of Somalis depend on food aid, 
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and as much as 73 percent of the population in 2008 lived on a daily income below $2, 
with 43 percent living on less than $1 daily.29 In a report released at the end of March 
2008, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pointed to a 
desperate “humanitarian crisis in the country,” exacerbated by an ongoing drought that 
has left millions without access to drinkable water. “The water shortage has forced many 
people to walk long distances - up to 20 kilometers in some cases - while others are 
selling the remaining commodities they have to purchase water,” the agency said.30 
Meanwhile, the UN’s long-standing appeal for humanitarian aid has been largely ignored 
by major world powers, with only $251 million raised, little more than a quarter of the 
$918 million requested.31 
 A country's infant mortality rate has been used for years to measure the status of 
its infrastructure and general level of development. At 107.42 deaths per 1,000 live 
births, Somalia's infant mortality rate is currently one of the highest in the world, fifth 
behind Angola, Afghanistan, Niger, and Mali.32 Tellingly, four of the five countries with 
the highest rates of infant deaths are in Africa, with the other, Afghanistan, in a state of 
civil war for the past decade. Furthermore, Somalia's rate of life expectancy at birth, 50 
years, is one of the lowest on the planet. At the rank of 213, it is again in a long line of 
African countries with a low level of social development. The only countries outside the 
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African continent that have lower life expectancy rates are Afghanistan and Haiti.33 
What's more, Somalia's literacy rate, defined as the percentage of those 15 years and 
older who are able to read and write, is at a dismal 37.8 percent, with only 25.8 percent of 
the female population being literate.34 Finally, in a particularly modern index of social 
development, Somalia only has three Internet hosts. Only the small east African island of 
Mayotte and the tiny Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands off the east coast of Canada have 
fewer hosts.35 
 The effects of this widespread impoverishment and social backwardness can be 
seen everywhere in Somalia, from the streets of its larger cities such as Mogadishu and 
Kismayo to its rural desert and mountain villages. Gangs of children struggling to survive 
roam the streets in Somalia's cities, where basic infrastructure and social services have all 
but collapsed, trying to make a living and in some cases providing for families by doing 
such menial labor as shining shoes or washing cars. In a predominantly Islamic country, 
charities operating under the banner of Allah had previously catered to such vulnerable 
members of the population as these youngsters. However, funding for these services was 
cut after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, particularly from such richer states as Saudi 
Arabia, after the US government haphazardly branded many prominent Islamic charities 
as sponsors of terrorism.36 
 Added to this picture of social devastation are the manifestations of lawlessness 
reigning in the country ever since the beginning of its civil war in the early 1990s, as all 
sorts of criminal types, mercenaries, and beggars prey on what would in normal times be 
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law-abiding citizens. Meanwhile, many in the countryside move to the cities to get away 
from civil war violence, famine, and or drought.37 
 Compounding these social problems are Somalia's long bouts with natural 
calamities. Apart from the recurring droughts that have plagued Somalia's desert lands for 
thousands of years, there are frequent dust storms over its eastern plains in the summer, 
along with floods during the rainy season. The effects of local human activity have also 
compromised the health of the environment, as deforestation and the overgrazing of 
livestock have only contributed to erosion of the soil and desertification.38 
 Environmental damage caused by foreign parties, however, has arguably been 
even more considerable. As briefly mentioned in the review of the literature on Somali 
piracy in Chapter 2, Somalia’s remote and extensive shoreline has a long history of being 
used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste, which was unearthed in large 
quantities during the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunamis of December 2004. The 
waste in general was found to include harmful concentrations of radioactive uranium, 
lead, heavy metals such as mercury and cadmium, and other noxious substances.39 
 According to Jonathan Clayton, the culpability for this state of affairs lies largely 
with several Western shipping firms, which had taken advantage of the power vacuum 
arising from Somalia's long-standing civil war to sneak into the region and offload tons 
of toxic radioactive and industrial waste.40 In a 1998 session of the European Parliament 
in Brussels, Belgium, the European Green Party (GP) presented several copies of 
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contracts signed by two Italian companies, the firm Achair Partners and the waste broker 
Progresso, with warlords then in power in certain strategic areas of Somalia. The latter 
were to accept ten million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million from the two 
consortia.41 Indeed, Nick Nuttall of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) has 
estimated that the cost of dumping these materials off the Somali coastline is only $2.50 
per ton, compared to $1,000 per ton for disposing of them in Europe.42  
 Needless to say, the effects of this Western frugality for the Somali population 
have been disastrous. Far higher than normal rates of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers, 
abdominal hemorrhages, and unusual skin infections, all indicative of radiation sickness, 
have been reported, particularly around the northeastern coastal towns of Hobbio and 
Benadir.  The UNEP “had planned to do a proper, in-depth scientific assessment on the 
magnitude of the problem,” said Nuttall. “But because of the high levels of insecurity 
onshore and off the Somali coast, we are unable to carry out an accurate assessment ...”43  
 According to Ahmedu Ould-Abdallah, UN envoy for Somalia, the practice is still 
ongoing. “There [has been] no government control. There are few people with high moral 
ground … [and] yes, people in high positions are being paid off, but because of the 
fragility of the government, some of these companies now no longer ask the authorities. 
They simply dump their waste and leave.”44 According to the UNEP, the dumping 
scandal poses a very serious environmental hazard not only to Somalia, but also to the 
entire east African region.45 
 Anger at this state of affairs has influenced many in Somalia to seek their own 
                                            






form of retribution. Many Somalis, in particular those who derive their income from 
fishing, have argued that they have been compelled into acts of piracy as a result of their 
attempts to stop foreign ships from offloading this deadly cargo into the waters from 
which they have earned their livelihoods. In October 2008, Somali pirates captured a 
Ukrainian ship, the MV Faina, and used the press coverage from the attack to highlight 
the dumping scandal. Their act, according to pirate spokesman Januna Ali Jama, was a 
means of “reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of 
our country for nearly 20 years. The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe 
this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas.” 
According to the pirates, their $8 million ransom demand would go towards cleaning up 
the waste.46 
 To add insult to injury, foreign trawlers began poaching from Somalia’s seas at 
approximately the same time, with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster 
taken each year from what had traditionally been the domain of local Somali fishermen. 
As a result, these fishermen attempted to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers 
directly, on the high seas, or tried to levy a “tax” on them as compensation. “We don’t 
consider ourselves sea bandits,” said Somali fisherman Sugule Ali, also incidentally one 
of the foremost pirate leaders, to the British Independent newspaper. “We consider [the] 
sea bandits [to be] those who illegally fish and dump in our seas.”47 According to Peter 
Lehr, an expert on Somali piracy at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, “It’s 
almost like a resource swap. Somalis collect up to $100 million per year from pirate 
ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million per 
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year in fish from Somali waters.”48 
 In a telling telephone interview on the BBC, 25-year-old Somali pirate Dahir 
Mohamed Hayeysi, speaking from the pirate haven of Harardhere in central Somalia, 
outlined the reasons for his turning to piracy: 
 “I used to be a fisherman with a poor family that depended only on fishing. The 
first day joining the pirates came into my mind was in 2006. A group of our villagers, 
mainly fishermen I knew, were arming themselves. One of them told me that they wanted 
to hijack ships, which he said were looting our sea resources. He told me it was a national 
service with a lot of money in the end. [So] I took my gun and joined them. 
 “Years ago we used to fish a lot, enough for us to eat and sell in the markets. Then 
illegal fishing and [the] dumping of toxic wastes by foreign fishing vessels affected our 
livelihood, depleting the fish stocks. I had no other choice but to join my colleagues.” 
 “The only way the piracy can stop is if [Somalia] gets an effective government 
that can defend our fish. And then we will disarm, give our boats to the government, and 
be ready to work.”49 Referring to the international community's military response to the 
problem, Hayeysi resolutely says, “Foreign navies can do nothing to stop piracy.”50 
Indeed, the next chapter of this thesis will explore the correctness of that view. 
 
  “Anarchy On Land Means Piracy At Sea”51 
 But how did all this come to be? What can we learn from Somalia's past to further 
our understanding of Somali piracy? What brought about those social and economic 
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problems that have facilitated this epidemic? As the old adage goes, “Those who do not 
learn from past mistakes are doomed to repeat them.” With that in mind, not only will a 
historical analysis further our study of Somali piracy, it will also aid in the formulation of 
a solution to a complex problem. 
 Stretching back to a time before the written word, Somalia's is a history that is 
both long and fascinating. However, as is the case with most African countries, Somali 
nationalism did not start to set in amongst the population until the late 19th century. This 
was, coincidentally, a time when Western powers, and their notions of nationhood, began 
asserting their influence on the continent. 
The disparate peoples that had inhabited Somali territory for thousands of years 
up to that point, however, were not united by any all-encompassing feelings of “Somali-
ness,” but rather by close-knit and interrelated family, or clan, bonds. While nationalism 
has since been firmly established in Somalia, these clan bonds still figure as unifying 
elements in Somali society. Therefore, even a perfunctory historical narrative of the 
country reads primarily not as a history of a distinct Somali nation, but rather of the 
peoples inhabiting Somalia's geographical territory as it is defined today. 
 The territory of Somalia has been inhabited by hominids ever since the 
Paleaelithic period, stretching back some 2.5 million years ago. The earliest evidences of 
human activity, however, are cave paintings in the north of the country that have been 
dated to circa 9000 BCE. The most famous of these, the Laas Geel complex, contains 
some of the earliest known rock art on the whole of the African continent.52 
 Much evidence, such as ancient pyramidal structures, tombs, ruined cities, and 
stone walls, exists to support the theory that the mysterious Land of Punt, an ancient 
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civilization that was known for producing and exporting gold, aromatic resins, African 
blackwood, ebony, ivory, slaves, and wild animals, was in modern-day Somalia.53 In the 
4th and 5th centuries BCE, the city-states of Mossylon, Opone, Malao, Mundus, and 
Tabae, all located on what is today the Somali landmass, developed a prospering trade 
network with the civilizations of Phoenicia, Ptolemaic Egypt, Greece, Parthian Persia, 
Saba, Nabataea, and even the distant Roman Empire.54 
 Centuries later, the spread of Islam into Somalia occurred shortly after the birth of 
the religion itself. Early persecuted Muslims fled to the land of the Axumites, just west of 
the Red Sea, in what is today northern Somalia. Seeking protection from the Quraysh, a 
tribe that was known to vehemently oppose the spread of Islam and harass early converts 
to the faith, they received protection from the court of the Axumite emperor. They then 
settled in several parts of the Horn of Africa and promptly began spreading their 
religion.55 
 Islam spread further into Africa as Muslims won repeated military victories over 
the Quraysh throughout the 7th century. Merchants and sailors residing in what is today 
Somalia converted to the religion of their Arab trading partners in droves, as the major 
trading routes in the Mediterranean and Red Seas came under the control of the Muslim 
Caliphs. It was during this time that Islam spread to all corners of the Old World, 
including the distant lands of Indonesia. 
 By the 13th century, the Ifat sultanate had emerged as a major regional power in 
the Horn of Africa, increasing in size and prestige through successive military victories 
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over nearby kingdoms. In 1270 CE, the sultanate conquered the ancient Kingdom of 
Shewa, located in present-day Ethiopia, which ignited a rivalry with a nearby kingdom 
ruled by a dynasty of Christians, the Solomonids. This resulted in a series of wars that 
ultimately ended with the victory of the Solomonids over the Islamic Ifats.56 
 A century later saw the rise of the Ajuuraan sultanate, ruled by the house of the 
Gareen clan. Ruling well into the 17th century, the Gareens emphasized strong centralized 
administration, aggressive military policy, and open courting of foreign trading partners. 
The latter policy in particular led to the rapid growth of the Gareen’s commercial base, as 
the cities of Merca, Mogadishu, Barawa, Hobyo, and their respective ports oversaw the 
arrival and departure of merchant ships from Arabia, India, Venetia, Persia, Egypt, 
Portugal, and even as far away as China. To illustrate, in the early 15th century, 
Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama passed by Mogadishu, the historical and modern 
capital of Somalia, and noted that it was a large city with houses several stories high and 
large palaces in its center, in addition to many mosques with cylindrical minarets.57  
 In the 16th century, the cities of Mogadishu, Merca, and Barawa, all in the south 
of modern-day Somalia, were the centers of a thriving textile industry known as toob 
benadir, producing clothes specialized for the Arabian market. The capital also served as 
a transit shop for Swahili merchants from the Kenyan cities of Mombasa and Malindi and 
for the gold trade from Kilwa, in modern-day Tanzania. Furthermore, Jewish merchants 
traveling from southern Iran also brought their Indian textiles and fruit to the Somali 
coast in exchange for grain and wood.58 Clearly, Somalia has not always been a land of 
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poverty and political chaos. 
 After the downfall of the Gareens and their Ajuuraan sultanate in the late 17th 
century, successor states, among them ruled by the dynasties of the Gobroon, Gerad, 
Bari, and Hobyo clans, began to compete for influence in former Ajuuraan lands. 
However, these kingdoms agreed to let the successful policies of the Gareens continue, 
especially the former rulers' emphasis on castle-building and seaborne trade.  
 The Gobroon dynasty in particular ruled over something of a golden age in the 
history of Somalia. In the 1840s, the third sultan of the House of Gobroon, Yusuf 
Mahamud Ibrahim, led a victorious army over the Baardheere Jamaaca, a religious 
settlement founded on the upper Jubba river in southern Somalia that had been expanding 
in power and influence since 1819. This move restored stability in the region and 
revitalized the east African ivory trade. Sultan Ibrahim also nurtured cordial relations 
with the rulers of other kingdoms, some as far away as the Omani, Witu, and Yemeni 
sultans.59 
 Meanwhile, thousands of miles north, major European powers were engaged in 
the Berlin Conference, called in 1884 to regulate European colonization of the African 
continent. The resulting “Scramble for Africa” effectively ended most forms of African 
autonomy and self-governance on the continent, as kingdom after kingdom fell to better-
equipped and organized European armies. However, many refused to give up power 
peacefully, and organized colonial resistance wars that were often noted for the 
disproportionate number of casualties on the African side. 
 One such leader, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, was a Muslim ascetic monk, or 
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Dervish, who rallied support across the Horn of Africa against the approaching European 
colonists. He aimed his ire at the British in particular, who had carved out much of 
modern-day Somalia as their colonial sphere of influence during the Berlin Conference. 
Known for his rousing poems and speeches, Hassan accused the British of destroying the 
Islamic faith and raising native African children as their own, and also harangued the 
nearby Ethiopian Christians for their pro-European attitudes. Going one step further, he 
also issued a religious ordinance calling on all Africans to fight colonialism. Whoever did 
not do so was to be considered a kafir, an “unbeliever” or “infidel.” According to Richard 
H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew in their Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors 
of Contemporary Combat, Hassan soon emerged as “a champion of his country's political 
and religious freedom, defending it against all Christian invaders.”60 
 As the anti-colonial campaign grew from within, Hassan found himself receiving 
support from without. Other Islamic states, such as Turkey and Sudan, saw to it that 
Hassan's movement was well supplied with money and weapons. In 1896, Hassan found 
himself with enough authority and influence to proclaim the founding of a new Dervish 
state, appointing ministers and advisers to administer different areas of the Horn.61 
 True to his word, Hassan guided his state's foreign policy in a strong anti-Western 
direction, launching attack upon attack on British forces stationed in the region. At first, 
Hassan's anti-British offensive met with success, and even garnered support from other 
actors engaged in their own anti-British maneuvers, such as the Ottomans and the 
Germans. However, the British military, through a combination of attrition, superior 
airpower, and their infamous divide-and-rule tactics, eventually found themselves gaining 
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the upper hand. By 1920, after more than two decades of Dervish resistance to colonial 
influence, Hassan's state collapsed after repeated British air strikes. What had once been 
Dervish territory was subsequently incorporated into a new British protectorate. The new 
territory was henceforth to be called British Somaliland, located in what is today the 
northwestern Somali region of Somaliland.62 
 Throughout this time, Italy was also a major colonial player in the region, having 
been one of the major participants at the 1884 Berlin Conference. There, the European 
powers had agreed to cede much of modern-day Somalia, except Somaliland in the north, 
to the Italians. Under successive so-called “protection” treaties, the Italians were to rule 
this region, called Italian Somaliland, for almost half a century, from 1889 to 1936. The 
Italians who migrated to their new colony made it a point to respect the native Somalis' 
clan differences and Islam as the country's official religion. They also oversaw a 
program, however limited, of industrial development, such as the building of ports, 
railways between select major Somali cities, and even schools.63 
 With the beginning of the Second World War came a new jockeying for influence 
in the Horn of Africa. On August 3, 1940, Italian troops, along with military units of 
native Somalis, crossed from Ethiopia in the south to invade British Somaliland in the 
northwest. Just two weeks later, on August 14, the Italian force succeeded in taking the 
northern coastal city of Berbera from the British. Not to be outdone, the British launched 
a counterattack from Kenya with a joint British-African force in January 1941. The 
objective had a dual objective: liberate British Somaliland and conquer Italian 
Somaliland. The British soon found themselves masters once again in British Somaliland 
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and, by February, the new rulers of its Italian counterpart.  
 However, eight years later, in November 1949, Italy was to reclaim its lost 
colony. The newly-founded United Nations granted the Italians trusteeship of Italian 
Somaliland, but only under close supervision and on the condition that Somalia was to 
achieve independence within ten years. The status was agitated for by several native 
Somali organizations, such as the Somali Youth League (SYL), the Hizbia Digil Mirifle 
Somali (HDMS) (later known as Hizbia Dastur Mustaqbal Somali), and the Somali 
National League (SNL). In the meantime, British Somaliland in the northwest was to 
remain under British control until 1960,64 while French Somaliland, a French colony that 
occupied the territory of present-day Djibouti, was directly northwest of its British 
counterpart. 
On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland finally gained its independence. Italian 
Somaliland followed suit five days later, and the two promptly united to form the Somali 
Republic. (French Somaliland, incidentally, did not gain its independence until seven 
years later.) A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa, with Aden Abdullah Osman 
Daar as President and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister. On July 20, 1961, by 
popular referendum, the Somali people ratified a new constitution. Sensing the winds of 
change, many Italian colonists still in the country began to emigrate. By the time the 
Somali constitution was ratified, fewer than 10,000 were left.65  
 However, any popular exuberance felt because of Somalia's newfound 
independence dissipated by the end of the 1960s. On October 15, 1969, then-Somali 
President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was killed by one of his own bodyguards while on a 
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visit to the northern town of Las Anod. The assassination was followed by a shift in the 
corridors of power in Mogadishu, with the Somali Army promptly seizing power in a 
bloodless coup d'etat. Just one day after Shermarke's funeral, on October 21, 1969, the 
commander of the Somali Army, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, found himself at 
the helm of the Somali state.66 
 Barre, along with Major General Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and soon-to-be Chief of 
Police Jama Korshel, went on to dissolve the parliament and the Supreme Court, and also 
suspended the constitution. From that point on, the “Supreme Revolutionary Council,” 
(SRC) essentially a group of pro-Barre lawmakers and other statesmen, was designated as 
Somalia's new ruling body. The Somali Republic was also renamed, to the Somali 
Democratic Republic (SDR).67 
 The SRC then inaugurated a series of large-scale public works programs - among 
them a successful campaign to increase literacy in rural and urban areas - and also 
nationalized Somali industry and land. Barre also placed Somalia within the orbit of the 
Arab world, emphasizing its cultural and religious links with Islam. Somalia joined both 
the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (later renamed the African Union 
[AU]) in 1974, with Barre serving as chairman of the latter organization. Two years later, 
the SRC was renamed the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The ruling 
party's new name simply accentuated the political direction it had been following ever 
since it attained power in late 1969. Barre's emphasis on state control of industry and 
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land, coupled with a strict adherence to the Islamic faith, continued.68 
 Then, in July 1977, war broke out in east Africa. Barre, a fervent nationalist, 
sought to expand the borders of Somalia to encompass those lands which ostensibly had a 
majority of Somalis, a rallying cry that is known as “Greater Somalia” among political 
circles in the region. As it was, many of these regions stretched into neighboring 
countries, namely, Ethiopia and Kenya. When it became known that Barre intended to 
incorporate into Somalia the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, which 
encompasses much of the “horn” that lies immediately to the west of central Somalia (see 
Figure 1 on page 33), Ethiopia not unexpectedly declared war, and the so-called Ogaden 
War began.69 
 The first week of the conflict saw Somali forces take southern and central 
Ogaden. This began a series of successful offensives on the part of the Somali military 
that saw it chasing the Ethiopians as far southwest into their country as Sidamo. By 
September 1977, Somalia controlled 90 percent of the Ogaden region. It was at this point 
that the world took notice. East Africa became, for however brief a time, the central stage 
of the Cold War, as the US and the Soviet Union immediately began investing material 
interest in the region.  
 While Barre had pursued a largely Soviet-inspired path of national development 
in Somalia since his first day in office, it was Somali neighbor Ethiopia that had the lion's 
share of Soviet support. Once the explicitly communist Derg regime took power in the 
country in 1974, the Soviets began courting Ethiopia as a counterweight to US influence 
in the region. Hence, when news reached Moscow of the Somali siege of the northeastern 
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Ethiopian city of Harar in late 1977, the Soviets made their move. They began a 
mobilization of approximately 20,000 Cuban troops and several thousand Soviet military 
advisers with the aim of repelling the Somali offensive. The counter-attack proving 
successful, Ethiopia regained control of the Ogaden by 1978.70 
 Surrounded by rivals that had the exclusive backing of one of the world's two 
superpowers, the Barre government naturally sought the support of the other major 
power, namely, the Soviets' Cold War archrival, the US. Barre continued to rule, with 
American support, but under a new constitution that called for a popularly elected 
People's Assembly. This, however, was largely window dressing, as Barre's Somali 
Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) still controlled the helms. In October 1980, the 
SRSP disbanded and the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was re-established in its 
place. Barre's military dictatorship, however, remained.71 
 By the beginning of 1981, cracks were starting to appear in the edifice of Barre's 
Somalia. The Ogaden War, which led to such a devastating defeat for the Somali 
military, drained Barre's government of a substantial amount of moral authority. Also, 
living under a military dictator with official American support led to something of an 
identity crisis for many Somalis. Through their exposure to the American way of life, 
whether by way of radio or television broadcasts, or even the Americans sent to Somalia 
to advise the Barre government itself, the Somali nation gradually became disillusioned 
with life under an authoritarian political system.  
 The monumental shift in world politics that occurred with the ending of the Cold 
War in the early 1990s led to a further weakening of the Barre government. The new 
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Russian government made it a priority to remove all material support its Soviet 
predecessor had given to its Third World vassal states, and Ethiopia was no exception. 
Once Washington became aware of this development, it likewise pulled out of Somalia, 
leaving Barre to rule a society that had increasingly become ill disposed to his 
government throughout the 1980s.72 
 Sensing this popular resentment, Barre's government became increasingly 
totalitarian. Signs of political and economic deterioration began to appear everywhere in 
Somalia. In 1990, the government issued an edict prohibiting people from gathering in 
groups greater than four individuals in major Somali cities. Fuel shortages were leading 
to long lines of both cars and people at gasoline stations. Inflation was rampant, with the 
price of such staples as dry noodles and khat, a popular narcotic leaf, skyrocketing. The 
official currency became almost worthless, with the metal in the coins being melted for 
its higher value. Black markets returned to the streets of major cities in Somalia. 
Incidentally, those same streets were often bathed in darkness at night, as the government 
had sold off the generators used to provide electricity. Finally, “disappearances” of select 
individuals from their homes, reputedly at the hands of government authorities, were a 
daily occurrence.73 
 Various resistance movements, many supported by arch-rival Ethiopia, began to 
develop in Somalia as a response, chief among them the Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front (SSDF), the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement 
(SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Movement 
(SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), and the Somali Manifesto Group 
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(SMG). In 1991, after more than two decades of dictatorship, President Mohamed Siad 
Barre was removed from office by a combined force of select northern and southern 
Somali clans, all of whom, incidentally, were materially supported by Ethiopia. At the 
same time, the former colony of British Somaliland in the northwest declared its 
independence from greater Somalia. Naming itself “Somaliland,” its independent status 
still holds to this day, although no foreign government has recognized it as such.74 
 In January 1991, shortly after they had ousted Barre from power, the rebels 
selected Abgaal clan leader Ali Mahdi Muhammad as the interim Somali president. 
However, some rebel groups refused to recognize him, causing a split between the SNM, 
USC, and SPM on one side, and the SMG, SDM, and SNA on the other. Meanwhile, 
Barre, who still claimed to be the legitimate president of Somalia, commanded 
considerable support in the south of the country. There, fighting between his supporters 
and the rebel groups led to widespread destruction, with Mogadishu, once called the 
“pearl of the Indian Ocean,” largely reduced to ruins. Furthermore, the civil war caused 
tremendous devastation among the population, with 300,000 dying from famine.75  
In response to the humanitarian disaster in Somalia, in 1992, the UN Security 
Council authorized a limited peacekeeping operation, UN Operation in Somalia I 
(UNOSOM I). UN troops were only permitted the use of violence in self-defense, which 
led to a warm welcome upon their arrival from both the pro- and anti-Barre camps in 
Somalia. However, their presence was soon disregarded and overshadowed by the larger 
dynamic of the civil war, prompting the US to organize a military coalition charged with 
the task of creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the management of 
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humanitarian operations. The new coalition, United Task Force (UNITAF) was, unlike 
UNOSOM I, allowed to use violence in pursuit of its goal. Entering Somalia in December 
1992 under the auspices of Operation Restore Hope, it was successful for a time in 
restoring order and alleviating hunger. It left the country in May 1993 to allow its new 
UN counterpart, UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), to carry out its functions in 
the more stable environment UNITAF had created. 
 However, problems soon arose for the international community, as elements 
within the rebel camps began to perceive the UN presence as a threat to their power. In 
June 1993, the militia of clan leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid attacked UNOSOM II troops 
in Mogadishu, leading to over 80 casualties on both sides. Fighting escalated until 19 
American troops and more than 1,000 civilians were killed in a raid in Mogadishu in 
October 1993. After two years of unabated violence, the UN withdrew its forces from the 
country in 1995. Law and order had still not been established, with some even pointing 
their fingers at the UN for showing alleged partiality to clan leader Aidid at one point, 
over and above those of other warlords. The civil war, in the meantime, continued to 
rage.76  
Then, in December 2006, Ethiopian troops, in conjunction with the US, invaded 
the country in support of the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
The objective was to overthrow an Islamic government that was formed by a movement 
known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamist organization that was accused 
by Washington of having ties to Al Qaeda. In the ensuing resistance, an estimated 16,000 
civilians lost their lives, while another 1.2 million were made refugees. Ethiopia finally 
pulled its troops out of Somalia in 2007, causing the TFG to collapse. A former leader of 
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the UIC was subsequently elected Somalia's new president.  
 The civil war has not abated since then. The moderate Islamic forces of the TFG, 
largely supported by the international community, have been fighting against the more 
radical Islamist militias, many of which are grouped under the “Al-Shabaab” moniker. 
The resulting anarchy has proven a boon for all sorts of criminal elements, from drug 



















5. The Response Thus Far 
 The International Reaction 
As we have seen, some uncivil elements have benefited from the Somali piracy 
epidemic. Many individuals have a continued interest in seeing the Somali pirates 
continue their activities unhindered. Among them can be found poor Somali town 
dwellers who are attracted by the appeal of easy pirate money in a land of grinding 
poverty, businessmen in Dubai or Abu Dhabi who are involved in the laundering of pirate 
booty on the side, and arms dealers working in Mogadishu's markets and bazaars who 
keep the pirates well stocked with a ready supply of guns and ammunition.  
 While the major world powers' military response to the epidemic has received the 
most media attention, there are other actors who are taking smaller, but arguably just as 
effective, steps to deal with the problem. A popular handbook published and periodically 
updated by a plethora of international organizations, including the European Union (EU), 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB), has been circulating in the corridors and cabins of merchant vessels plowing the 
waters of the Indian Ocean. Known as Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia & in the Arabian Sea Area (or BMP3 for short), it has received 
recognition as today's authoritative guide for shipping crews on how to defend 
themselves against pirates.1  
 Among the measures BMP3 contains are: installing razor wire on the ship's deck; 
rigging fire-hoses to spray sea water over the side of the ship; constructing a shelter 
where the ship's crew can safely escape in case of pirate infiltration’ and even the 
                                            
1 Consortium of International Organizations, June 2010. BMP3 Best Management Practice III. Piracy Off 
   the Coast of Somalia and the Arabian Sea Area. London: Witherby Seamanship International, 2010. 
 68
positioning of mannequins posing as armed guards which pirates might mistake for the 
real thing from a distance. Indeed, the hiring of private armed guards is not excluded 
from the list of protective measures. As a matter of fact, the US government has removed 
its long-standing prohibition against the hiring of private security guards on US-flagged 
vessels in the wake of the epidemic.2  
 Shipping companies have followed the US example, utilizing private security 
guards to protect their vessels against piracy. One of the largest firms offering its services 
in this growing market is Espada Logistics & Security Group (ELSG). Founded in 2004, 
and based in San Antonio, Texas, its security officers “provide on-board protection from 
a ship’s point of entry to its point of destination,”3 along with “anti-piracy training en 
route to the Gulf of Aden.”4 To make it even more effective, ELSG has “teamed up with 
African Shipping Lines, a leading international shipping line company, to provide 
security to vessels traveling along the coast of east Africa.”5  
Beyond these small pro-active measures lies the much-publicized international 
military campaign against Somali piracy, which has united nation-state actors far and 
wide, large and small, hostile and friendly, in the pursuit of one objective: countering the 
Somali pirate threat. At the present moment, there are three “international naval task 
forces” patrolling the Gulf of Aden and its environs for any sign of pirate activity: 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, and the European 
Union Naval Force in Somalia (EUNAVFOR), the latter under the aegis of Operation 
Atalanta. These three coalitions are composed of select naval vessels from prominent 
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nation-states, and through the use of representatives coordinate their activity in a monthly 
conference that has been dramatically titled Shared Awareness and  
Deconfliction (SHADE).6 
 The largest coalition of the three is CTF 150, primarily because it is, alongside its 
anti-piracy mission, also responsible for other assignments. Chief among these is its 
logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom land forces stationed in the North Arabian 
Sea, a task that uses up most of its manpower and resources. While it has been dominated 
by the US Navy, other countries have contributed to its mission. These include South 
Korea, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, the UK, Australia, Italy, Holland, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey.7 
 More restricted in its mission is Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, which, like 
CTF 150, is also an international naval task force that has been established to fight piracy 
in the western Indian Ocean. However, unlike CTF 150, CTF 151 is solely assigned to 
fighting piracy, and serves no other purpose.8 
 Many powers have commanded CTF 151, from the navies of the US, to South 
Korea, to Turkey, to Singapore, which holds the responsibility today. The command staff 
is of mixed nationalities, and manages daily operations from onboard the South Korean 
naval vessel ROKS Kang Gamchan. The Kang Gamchan is classified as a Chungmugong 
Yi Sun-Sin class destroyer, considered one of the most modern of its kind in the world.9 
 The CTF 151 force initially consisted of US ships San Antonio, Mahan, and the 
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English HMS Portland. Twenty other countries have since contributed to CTF 151 with 
either manpower or military hardware. These include South Korea, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Holland, Pakistan, and Singapore. Australia has also contributed to the force with 
its own warship, HMAS Warramunga, which was re-tasked from active duty in the 
Persian Gulf to join its international allies in fighting the pirate threat.10 
 European powers in particular play a significant role in the international anti-
piracy campaign off the Horn of Africa. In support of UN Security Council resolutions 
181611, 183812, and 184613, all drafted and ratified in 2008, the EU launched Operation 
Atalanta (OA) that same year, to be carried out by the newly founded EU Naval Force in 
Somalia (EUNAVFOR). EUNAVFOR was charged with protecting humanitarian aid 
ships, reducing pirate disruption to shipping routes, and re-stabilizing the maritime 
environment in the region.14  
Thus far, 26 countries have contributed to the operation, while 13 EU member 
states have provided operational contributions, in the form of ships, personnel, or aircraft. 
These include France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Holland, Italy, Belgium, the UK 
(which hosts EUNAVFOR headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta, and Estonia. 
Other member states have provided military staff to work at either the EUNAVFOR 
headquarters in the UK or onboard EUNAVFOR vessels. This includes Cyprus, 
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Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland, and 
Finland.15  
Those European states that have opted out of EU membership or do not yet 
belong to the EU have also sought to contribute to the mission. Norway announced on 27 
February 2009 that it would send the frigate HNOMS Fridtjof Nansen to the area to join 
in the anti-piracy campaign; it did so six months later. The Swiss Parliament, in the 
meantime, called for the deployment of elite Army Reconnaissance Detachment troops to 
combat piracy. The proposal, however, was rejected after one vote.16 
During east Africa’s monsoon season, when the rate of pirate attacks decreases 
due to the characteristically stormy weather and rough waters, EUNAVFOR sends fewer 
vessels and personnel to the region. The rate of attacks again increases at the onset of the 
dry season, during which EUNAVFOR responds in kind. The force typically consists of 
five to ten naval ships, one to two auxiliary ships, and two to four aircraft. Staff-wise, it 
consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel. It operates in a zone that comprises 
the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the western Indian Ocean, the region 
where piracy has been concentrated for the past five years. This represents an area of two 
million square nautical miles, a huge expanse of sea that provides more than enough 
space for a maximum force of twelve ships, four aircraft, and 2,000 personnel.17 
Surprisingly, Japan also announced its intention, on 28 January 2009, of sending a 
naval task force to join the anti-piracy campaign. The issue was controversial in the 
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country, as its constitution specifically forbids the use of military forces for non-
defensive purposes. The ruling party, however, justified its decision by declaring that the 
mission was tasked with fighting crime, rather than being a military operation. On 
February 4, 2009, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) sent a fact-finding 
mission to the region prior to the deployment of the JDS DD-106 Samidare and JDS DD-
113 Sazanami destroyers. The two destroyers were deployed to the region on March 14, 
2009, with the intention of staying on for four months. In its first mission, the JDS DD-
113 Sazanami was able to fight off pirates attempting to hijack a Singaporean cargo 
ship.18 
Notably absent from the international anti-piracy list that has been outlined so far, 
however, are those countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an 
alliance of central Asian states currently composed of members Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; observers India, Iran, Mongolia, 
and Pakistan; and dialogue partners Belarus and Sri Lanka. This is not because these 
countries have refused to participate in the campaign. On the contrary, they have been 
participating with zeal and vigor.  
Unlike the multinational character of CTF 150, 151, and EUNAVFOR, however, 
the member states of the SCO have preferred to go it alone. China in particular outstrips 
all other SCO countries in terms of the number of military vessels and personnel 
deployed to the region. Its contribution to the campaign began on 18 December 2008, 
when it announced that it would be deploying ships, helicopters, and personnel off the 
coast of Somalia to escort Chinese vessels through the Gulf of Aden. The ships turned out 
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to be guided missile destroyers, specifically the Haikou, the Wuhan, and the supply ship 
Weishanhu.  
Just a few months later, Beijing began to deploy several flotillas to the region, 
composed of the military vessels Ma’anshan, Wenzhou, Qiandaohu, Chaohu, 
Guangzhou, Chaohu, Kunlun Shan, Lanzhou, Zhoushan, and Xushou. In terms of 
manpower, it is believed that the Chinese have more than 800 military personnel 
operating in the region.19 Taking these figures into consideration, it has even surpassed 
the contributions from several prominent Western countries, such as the US and Canada.  
India has also lent its support. It deployed two of its warships, the INS Tabar and 
Mysore, into the region to fight piracy. This force was tested when, on 14 March 2011, a 
skirmish ensued between Somali pirates and members of the Indian Navy. The Indian 
naval officers prevailed, and went on to seize 61 pirates, who had been fighting from a 
mother ship. The pirates had been holding the crew of a large commercial vessel hostage, 
all 13 of whom were rescued unscathed. As of this writing, India has also expressed 
interest in deploying up to four more warships to join the INS Tabar and Mysore.20 
Russia, for its part, has also sent several warships, though the scope of its 
contribution is smaller than that of China and India. As of this writing, it is reported that 
the Russian Navy has approximately 350 sailors in the region, serving on three military 
vessels: the destroyer Admiral Panteleyev, along with an unnamed tugboat and tanker. 
Like China and India, it has chosen to fight piracy alone, without the assistance of 
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another country or multi-national anti-piracy task force.21 
Middle Eastern governments have also lent their support to the campaign. In the 
wake of the Somali pirate seizure of an Egyptian ship and a Saudi supertanker carrying 
$100 million of oil in 2008, the Arab League, an alliance of Arabic states formed in 1945, 
called for a summit of countries in the Red Sea region, including Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Members of the summit discussed the 
possibility of alternate, more secure, shipping routes for national sea carriers, as well as 
joining the international anti-piracy campaign  
off the Somali coast.22 
 
What Has Been Done at the National/Regional Level? 
Throughout the duration of the anti-piracy campaign, Somalia's floundering 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been battling a multitude of Islamist 
organizations, mainly in the central and southern regions of the country. This civil war 
has been ongoing for more than twenty years, and it has seriously compromised the 
TFG’s ability to govern, and, as a consequence, its public image. While the TFG may 
have given permission to some members of the international community to enter its 
territory in search of pirates, something the UN has authorized in countless resolutions, in 
reality, its weak position leaves it little choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the 
world powers.  
Furthermore, the TFG’s reputation is not helped by revelations that some of its 
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members have engaged in wheeling and dealing with the country’s homegrown pirates. 
The temptation to share in the stolen money, which the pirates often parade in Somalia’s 
towns and villages like badges of honor, has simply proven to be too much for some TFG 
representatives. In establishing contact with pirate leaders, these individuals have 
showered themselves with wealth that had been undreamed of years ago. Along with this, 
however, has come a loss of faith in the TFG from both respectable Somalis within the 
country and concerned citizens abroad.23 
So far as the fight against piracy within Somalia is concerned, it has not been the 
TFG that has made any inroads, but Somalia’s local and regional governments. 
Throughout 2009 and 2010, the government of the autonomous Puntland region, located 
in the northeast of the country, enacted a series of measures as part of its declared anti-
piracy campaign. They included: “the arrest, trial, and conviction of pirate gangs; raids on 
suspected pirate hideouts and confiscation of weapons and equipment; adequate coverage 
of its anti-piracy efforts by both local and international media; a social campaign led by 
Islamic scholars and community activists aimed at discrediting piracy and highlighting its 
negative aspects; and a partnership with the NATO alliance to combat pirates at sea.”24  
This campaign has also been helped by the construction in 2010 of a new naval 
base in the town of Bandar Siyada, a small Puntland town 25 kilometers west of the 
region’s commercial capital, Bosaso. The regional government is funding the project, 
which is also receiving financial and logistical assistance from UK-based security 
company Saracen International. Besides serving as a center for training recruits, the base 
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will also function as a command post for the naval force, which will be actively charged 
with fighting the pirate threat.25 
Directly outside Somalia, the 54-member African Union (AU), for its part, has 
also maintained a peacekeeping force in the country throughout the epidemic. This 
detachment was augmented when, in a UN-sponsored international donors’ conference 
held in mid-2009, a group of benefactors pledged more than $250 million to strengthen 
Somalia’s security forces. Most of the funding went to the AU force, which was expected 
to expand to 8,000 troops from its original 4,350. Some of the money was also earmarked 
for then-Somali President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed of the TFG, who sought to build up 
a police force of 10,000, along with a separate security force of 6,000.26 
While pirate leaders continue to wield tremendous authority in Somalia, the 
enactment of all these measures by local, regional and international authorities has 
reportedly led to a substantial decrease in the rate of pirate attacks directly off the Somali 
coast. The number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped from 86 in 2009 to 33 by the 
summer of 2010. Pirates had by that time already expanded their range of operations into 
the wider Indian Ocean to escape both the regional and international police presence.27 
 
Trying the Pirates 
Most of the suspected pirates who have been captured by these military 
operations, both regional and international, have been set free for lack of evidence. The 
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few who are punished with any sorts of sanctions usually find themselves in the headlines 
of the international media. Some of the more notable trials are outlined below:  
1) In May 2010, a Yemeni court sentenced six convicted Somali pirates to death and 
imposed harsh jail sentences on six others for their part in the hijacking of a Yemeni oil 
tanker in 2009. After a skirmish with the pirates, one crew member was allegedly killed, 
and another one went missing.28 
2) A milestone was set when, also in May 2010, the Netherlands became the first 
European country to try alleged Somali pirates. The incident for which they were tried 
occurred in January 2009, when a Danish vessel stopped a group of pirates in the Gulf of 
Aden as they were on their way to board a Dutch cargo ship. The pirates in question were 
each sentenced to five years in prison.29 
3) Perhaps the most widely covered modern pirate trial, however, occurred in a New 
York federal court, again in May 2010. There, Somali Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse pled 
guilty to the April 2009 seizing of US-flagged ship Maersk Alabama, along with the 
kidnapping of its captain. This incident was notable for the heavy use of American 
firepower, in the form of US Navy SEAL snipers, in the rescue of the crew of the Maersk 
Alabama. While none of the Maersk Alabama crew was killed, several pirates lost their 
lives in the skirmish. Muse, in the meantime, was sentenced to 33 years imprisonment for 
his part in the affair.30  
4) Another incident occurred on 1 April 2010, when US military vessel USS Nicholas 
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received fire from a group of Somalis on board a skiff. The Nicholas chased and captured 
both the skiff and, later, its mother ship, along with all the individuals on board. The US 
government charged the Somalis with piracy, but Federal District Court judge in Norfolk, 
Virginia, Raymond A. Jackson, threw out the charge due to an 1819 law that defines 
piracy as solely “robbery at sea,” the penalty being life imprisonment. Since there was 
never an act of robbery during the April 1 incident, much less an attempt at it, many 
commentators agreed with Jackson’s decision. The federal government, however, 
managed to overturn Jackson’s ruling, and saw to it that the five Somalis who had 
attacked the USS Nicholas were sentenced to life.31 
5) On 28 January 2011, off the coast of India, hijacked Thai trawler Prantalay, which had 
been serving a gang of Somali pirates as a mother ship, was involved in a skirmish with 
Indian naval forces. The Indians managed to kill 10 pirates and capture 15, while 
rescuing the 20 Thai and Burmese fishermen that were being held by the pirates as 
hostages. The 15 captured pirates were then taken to Mumbai, where they were 
subsequently tried under the Indian Penal Code for attempted murder, unlawful entrance 
of Indian waters, and various other crimes, including piracy. Besides the fact that the 
incident occurred so far away from the Somali coast, another interesting, and telling, side 
note concerns the ethnicity of the pirates. Along with the Somalis in  
the party were Ethiopian and Kenyan pirates.32  
 Throughout all this, Somalia’s TFG has questioned the jurisdiction of foreign 
countries in extraditing and trying the pirates within their respective territories. Sensitive 
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to this criticism, the EU has tried to keep the trials confined to Africa, by involving 
Somalia’s more politically stable neighbors. TFG authorities have nevertheless called for 
the pirates to be tried under their jurisdiction.33 Due to the TFG’s highly unstable 
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6. A Serious Solution 
 Many actors far and wide have felt the impact of Somali piracy, from sailors 
crossing the Indian Ocean, to shipping company executives, to influential politicians, to 
adventurous investigative journalists. As was written in the rationale to this thesis, acts of 
seaborne piracy, the vast majority presently concentrated in the western Indian Ocean, 
lead to an average of $13-$16 billion in losses for transport companies each year.1 This is 
simply too large an amount to ignore. 
 Somali piracy is not simply a problem confined to a small, impoverished, 
politically unstable nation, in some remote part of the world that would otherwise best be 
forgotten. On the contrary, this epidemic has affected almost everybody involved in 
international shipping, a multibillion-dollar industry that is vital to the world economy. 
Likewise, the area in which Somali piracy prevails, the Gulf of Aden and its environs, is 
also one of the most vital routes in international shipping, with approximately 11 percent 
of the world's seaborne petroleum alone making its way through the gulf's waters.2 
 The influence of the international shipping industry has brought the international 
community into the fray. While this community’s naval response to the problem has 
significantly reduced pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the Somali pirates have simply 
expanded their operations and are now threatening new sea routes and waterways. As of 
now, there is no sign that the naval campaign will be expanded, thus leaving the pirates a 
huge area in which to continue their activities unhindered. 
 Meanwhile, the pirates’ country of origin, Somalia, continues to fester in 
conditions of economic impoverishment and civil war. As this thesis argues, the only 
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solution to this problem lies in diplomacy, not violence and bloodshed. As I wrote in the 
previous chapter, such an approach “will not only have the effect of winning over the 
hearts and minds of the Somali people, substituting their corrupted faith in piracy for the 
viable road to social and economic development, [it] will also open up one large part of 
the east African landmass to international trade and investment, not to mention wipe the 
scourge of piracy from one of the world’s most strategic and economically vital 
transshipment points.” 
 The military campaign against piracy rests upon the assumption that a hands-
over-fist approach is needed. While this has contributed to a decline in the number of 
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, it has not erased the piracy threat. It has merely 
put the figurative band-aid on the problem, instead of addressing the conditions that have 
produced the epidemic in the first place. The pirates, aware of the increased concentration 
of military police vessels in their traditional haunts, have simply expanded their 
operations elsewhere. The modern pirate lifestyle is simply too lucrative to abandon.  
 As the historical outline in Chapter 3 of this thesis showed, piracy at sea has only 
flourished in the absence of law and order on land. Whether it was during the time of the 
Caesars, or the Spanish conquistadors, or stretching to the present day, whenever there 
has existed some sort of lawlessness on land, piracy off the coast has never been too far 
behind. Simply put, piracy has proven too lucrative an operation to not pursue under the 
right conditions. Unfortunately, these conditions usually entail a marked deficiency in the 
ability of the proper law enforcement authorities to curtail the epidemic. 
 When set against the large body of water where the pirates have been operating, 
the international anti-piracy campaign is microscopic; the number of ships and personnel 
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policing the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean for pirates is minuscule. 
Furthermore, a relative disunity exists amongst the state actors in the campaign. While 
they all agree that the piracy threat should be fought, even the member countries of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have not banded together into a common task 
force to fight the epidemic. In light of this, one cannot hold out too much hope for a truly 
international campaign under the aegis of a legitimate body of supra-national jurisdiction, 
such as the United Nations (UN). 
 It is not the argument of this author that policing the piracy epidemic in the open 
waters has no merit. On the contrary, such a policy can prove quite effective, but, as the 
historical record has shown, only when joined with the appropriate measures on land. At 
the height of the Imperial Age, for example, the Greek and Roman Empires ensured law 
and order on land and at sea. However, there is no such corresponding authority in the 
world today. Even the UN, composed as it is of a disparate community of nation-states, 
each with its own interests and objectives, cannot lay claim to such power and influence 
as the ancient empires exercised long ago. Indeed, one of the overriding benefits 
historians have accorded the empires of old has been their relative success at reining in 
crime within their respective territories, and, in the case of the Greek and Roman 
Empires, in the waters between their respective territories, as well. 
 Today, no great power has expressed an interest in deploying security forces in 
Somalia to address the anarchy that exists on its territory as a result of its long-standing 
civil war. In many respects, this unwillingness to support Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in its battle with radical Islamist militias is due to the disastrous 
experiences many foreign countries faced the last time they were part of an outside task 
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force aimed at restoring order in the country: United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) (1993-1995). The unabated violence UNOSOM II experienced in 
Somalia, and the operation’s ultimate failure, arguably did more than anything to 
persuade the international community to stay out of the country’s affairs for the indefinite 
future.  
 Where interventions have occurred, they have been executed by concerned 
neighboring nations, namely Ethiopia and Kenya. In 2006, Ethiopian troops intervened 
on behalf of the TFG, with US support. Even then, Washington preferred to keep 
American troops out, using the Ethiopians as proxies in their war against Somalia’s 
hardline Islamist forces. Ultimately, however, this strategy too proved unsuccessful. 
Then, in 2011, Kenya intervened. As of this writing, however, the outcome is still 
uncertain, with Washington taking a cautious wait-and-see attitude. 
 Western powers are fully aware that any future military intervention on their part 
would likewise end in failure. One need not look too far to the example of modern-day 
Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the historical examples of the US war with Vietnam 
(1965-1975) and the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989), to see how the 
policy of open military violence against an indigenous population often fails to achieve 
the invading power’s stated aims. While these aims might be related to restoring law and 
order or stabilizing the political situation in the country, any strategy solely involving 
guns, and no butter, more often than not simply proves ineffectual.  
 Sensing the futility of the problem, in November 2008, the International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (IAITO), an agglomeration of ship-owners 
that represents 75 percent of the world’s independent tanker fleet, called for the UN to 
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step in. IAITO wanted more than just resolutions authorizing countries to enter Somali 
waters in search of pirates; it called for a naval blockade of Somalia, along with the 
“monitoring of all vessels leaving the country’s coastline.”3 
 Reflecting the already limited nature of the police campaign, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) responded to the IAITO resolution by saying, “It would be 
impossible to effectively blockade Somalia’s vast coast.”4 As a result, IAITO tempered 
its demands, and called for all the Somali pirates’ “home ports” to be blockaded instead, 
along with “the insertion in Somalia itself of ground forces to destroy pirate bases.”5 
Considering the recent history of Western military involvement in Somalia, particularly 
during the earlier stages of its civil war, IAITO’s latter suggestion seemed exceptionally 
shortsighted. US policymakers in particular were reminded about the American military’s 
intervention in Mogadishu during the Blackhawk Down incident of 1993, when a number 
of US servicemen lost their lives trying to capture two high-ranking lieutenants of a 
Somali warlord. 
 Should the international community wish to stop piracy in its tracks, it has to pull 
the proverbial rug from under the feet of the Somali pirates. In other words, the 
underlying social and economic problems in Somalia that have engendered the spread of 
piracy, namely its structural poverty and retarded state of social development, should not 
only be recognized and addressed, but should also be actively remedied. A long-term 
strategy must be developed, beginning, as always, with baby steps. 
 A comprehensive policy that aims at strengthening the economic development of 
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such an impoverished country as Somalia entails a substantial amount of financial 
assistance from both developed and developing countries. Funds, whether in the form of 
grants or low-interest loans, need to be infused into the country should any progress be 
made on its road to development and political stability. The aspirations of the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals, such as improving educational standards, healthcare, 
and infrastructure, to promoting the use of cell phone and Internet usage, should be 
implemented with this injection of money from the developed and developing world. 
Achieving these goals will not only have the effect of winning over the hearts and minds 
of the Somali people, substituting their corrupted faith in piracy for the viable road to 
social and economic development, they will also open up one large part of the east 
African landmass to international trade and investment, not to mention wipe the scourge 
of piracy from one of the world’s most strategic and economically vital transshipment 
points.  
 Global and regional programs of assistance to Somalia certainly do exist. At the 
forefront are those the UN has funded, chief among them the World Food Programme 
(WFP). Established in 1961 to fight world hunger and malnutrition, the WFP has been 
diligently sending food to the war-torn country since the beginning of its civil war. 
According to its website, “the total number of people being fed by WFP in Mogadishu 
[the Somali capital] stands at 240,000. This includes 20 feeding centers that WFP 
supports across Mogadishu, feeding a total of 85,000 people each day.”6 Furthermore, 
with the aid of naval escorts provided by the EU and NATO, “more than 620,000 metric 
tons of WFP food – enough to feed 1.2 million people for one year – have been escorted 
                                            
6 “WFP Activities.” World Food Programme: Fighting Hunger Worldwide. Accessed 1 November 2011. 
     Available: <<http://www.wfp.org/countries/Somalia/Operations>>. 
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safely to Somalia since November 2007.”7  
 Other public, government agencies providing aid to Somalia include the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the EU’s European Commission (EC), 
and the African Union (AU). Private aid organizations also provide assistance in the form 
of money or manpower, from the French charity Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), to the 
British Islamic Relief (IR), to China’s own chapter of the international Red Cross Society 
(RCS). 
 However, there are several factors that in all probability will prevent an 
augmentation of such international assistance to Somalia in the near future. The actual 
rate of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden has, over the past several years, decreased 
significantly. Many have cited this as proof that the international anti-piracy campaign 
has proven successful, thus obviating the need for increasing, much less keeping 
constant, the campaign’s presence in the region. What has been overlooked in this 
argument is the fact that the pirates have simply left their traditional haunts in the Gulf of 
Aden and expanded into the wider Indian Ocean. However, many countries that have 
participated in the campaign would rather let the problem alone and focus on more 
pressing concerns closer to home. The piracy epidemic has, for all intents and purposes, 
been swept under the rug.  
 Second, considering the violently factionalized situation in the country, the 
question of who exactly is to receive the funds deserves careful deliberation. For the 
purposes of conflict resolution, the size and influence of the UN makes it the first choice 
for policymakers. However, in the case of Somalia, UN intervention has largely failed to 
achieve political stabilization. While this hasn’t entirely been the fault of the UN, it has 
                                            
7 Ibid. 
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reaped the lessons from its bloody experiences in the country and, as a result, has rejected 
sending more peacekeeping operations into one of the world’s most dangerous and 
volatile conflict zones. It goes without saying that other private and public institutions 
feel similarly about maintaining a presence on the ground. From charities to NGOs, all 
organizations are rightfully circumspect about deploying personnel or resources into a 
land of violent anarchy.  
 With that said, the only viable alternative is to build up the strength of the forces 
of law and order on the ground, namely, the TFG. This is the government that, in its 
effort to spread homegrown Somali democracy, has been fighting the forces of religious 
extremism for the past two decades. Consequently, it should continue to receive the 
majority of any financial support from the international community. The TFG should 
then use these funds to win the hearts and minds of native Somalis to democracy and 
religious freedom.  
 Granted, several members of the TFG have shown that they are not above graft 
and corruption, so there is a danger of misappropriation of funds should this avenue be 
followed.8 However, considering the alternatives, no other viable option truthfully exists. 
The TFG is the leading institution fighting, on the ground, for some sort of internationally 
acceptable governance. It is inevitable that there will be a small number of criminals and 
opportunists within its fold, as is the case for all large bodies of individuals. While the 
international community does regard the TFG as the current and promising future 
government of Somalia, it should not let the proverbial few bad apples spoil the entire 
harvest.  
                                            
8 Louis Charbonneau. “UN Cites Reports of Government Links to Somali Pirates.” Reuters. 18 March 
   2009. Available: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN18379298>>. 
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 Finally, any financial sacrifices, especially from the developed world, have to 
stand against today’s backdrop of economic recession and uncertainty. While many 
members of the international community do in fact assist Somalia on its road to 
development, this might be less and less of a priority in today’s economic climate, when 
many economies of the developed world, such as Greece, the UK, and even the US, are 
on the brink of collapse. Many countries in the developing world, however, such as the 
BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are enjoying robust economic 
growth, along with healthy trade surpluses and rapid social and economic development. 
The leaders of these nations are fully aware that supplying financial assistance to Somalia 
not only shows a good face, but it also opens up another market for exports, further 
increasing economic growth domestically, and, in the long term, internationally, as well.  
 In conclusion, reading the countless news articles and academic publications on 
the issue of piracy, it seems there are as many suggestions to resolve the piracy epidemic 
as there are actual pirates themselves. These suggestions range from an out-and-out 
invasion of Somalia to corral its citizens by brute force, to diplomatic, long-term 
alternatives that involve political stabilization, economic development, and poverty 
alleviation.9 
 This thesis has argued that in Somalia, as elsewhere, only by the resolution of 
long-standing social, economic, and political problems will any substantial headway be 
made to erase piracy from existence and secure the safe passage of vital commercial 
waterways. The military campaign currently being waged has not erased the piracy threat. 
It has merely put the figurative band-aid on the problem, instead of addressing the 
                                            
9 Lucas Velozo de Melo Bento. “’Along Liquid Paths’: The Dualistic Nature of International Maritime 
   Piracy Law.” 25 September 2010. Available at SSRN: <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682624>>. 
 89
conditions that have produced the epidemic in the first place.  
 In the end, the elimination of piracy from the Gulf of Aden and its environs will 
depend not only on the general international economic situation, but also on the 
willingness of the actors involved to seriously address, and ultimately expunge, the 
epidemic through substantial aid to Somalia. The international media, for its part, also has 
a responsibility to keep this modern scourge under scrutiny. Whether or not these 
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